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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A NEW TREATMENT FOR
AN OLD ILLNESS
THOMAS R. TEDCASTLE AND MARVIN A. DEWAR
The rising cost of medical malpractice insurance has been one of the
most difficult issues faced by the Florida Legislature for many years.
In an effort to reach a comprehensive solution to this recurring
problem, the 1986 Legislature created the Academic Task Force for
Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems, and directed it to conduct
a thorough review of Florida's tort system. In 1988, the Legislature
implemented several of the recommendations of the Task Force. In
this Article, the authors explore the factual findings and the
recommendations of the Task Force and analyze the effects that the
1988 legislation will have on the continuing medical malpractice
saga.
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MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A NEW TREATMENT FOR
AN OLD ILLNESS
THOMAS R. TEDCASTLE* AND MARVIN A. DEWAR**
S OLVING the dilemma between protecting the rights of injured pa-
tients and assuring the availability of affordable health care has
proved to be an evasive goal for the Legislature of this state and most
other jurisdictions. Prior legislative attempts to solve this dilemma
have produced mixed results, but have not erased the perception of a
continuing liability insurance crisis within the health care professions.
Thus, in 1986, after enacting one of the more sweeping tort and insur-
ance law reforms, the Florida Legislature referred the issue to acade-
micians and private citizens for an in-depth, independent evaluation.
The results of the study, although modified in the political arena, pro-
vided a foundation for a systematic approach to the prevention of
medical malpractice incidents and the provision of compensation for
injuries resulting from malpractice.
This Article will trace the development of the legislative response
and analyze the major tort reform provisions of the 1988 medical mal-
practice legislation. Although increased regulation of health care
professionals also represents a major component of the legislation
both in its intent to deter negligent conduct and to remove from the
profession those whose abilities leave the public at risk, a thorough
discussion of those provisions is left to others to undertake.
I. HISTORY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LEGISLATION IN FLORIDA
The concept of seeking damages for medical maloccurrences dates
back to English common law, yet the problems of medical malpractice
did not require the full attention of the Florida Legislature until the
1970's. Although health care providers were more likely than the gen-
eral population to be sued, the disparity did not seem significant
enough to warrant the development of legal doctrines separate from
those applied to general tort litigation. Medical liability insurance
premiums rose sharply in the early 1970's, however, and legislatures
throughout the country, including Florida's, focused on reform of the
* Staff Counsel, Florida House of Representatives, House Majority Office. B.S., 1974;
J.D., 1977, University of Florida.
** Assistant Professor of Medicine, University of Florida College of Medicine. B.S., 1977,
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medical malpractice tort system. The early attempts to differentiate
medical malpractice reforms from general tort reforms were successful
but short-lived. The provisions either were repealed, nullified by the
courts, or replaced by provisions affecting the tort system generally.
In establishing the Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance
and Tort Systems (Task Force), the Florida Legislature directed that
the study be a general review of the tort system.' Although supported
by various government officials and welcomed by the Legislature, the
decision by the Task Force to suggest specific medical malpractice re-
forms was of its own making.2 The Task Force determined that the
crisis in medical malpractice is of a different nature and magnitude
than the problems uncovered in its general tort review3 and that reli-
ance on the theory of a separate set of rules was desirable. Accord-
ingly, the Task Force reviewed prior legislative enactments which
attempted to institute such a system.
A. The 1975 Legislation
In 1975, Florida adopted its first major legislation governing medi-
cal malpractice actions.4 Occasioned by substantial increases in the
cost of liability insurance' and the withdrawal of many insurers from
the market, 6 the primary emphasis of the legislation was in the area of
insurance reform, including the creation of a joint underwriting
association 7 and a patients' compensation fund as an excess insurer,8
and expansion of the ability to self-insure. 9 While the insurance re-
forms remain intact, the Joint Underwriting Association for Medical
1. Ch. 86-160, § 63, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 756.
2. ACADEMIC TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS, PRELIMI-
NARY FACT-FINDING REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1 (Aug. 14, 1987) [hereinafter TASK
FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT].
3. See id.
4. Ch. 75-9, § 1, 1975 Fla. Laws 13, 15.
5. Note, The Florida Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, 4 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 50,
51 (1976). Argonaut Insurance Company, the major writer of physician coverage in Florida at
that time, raised its rates 96% effective January 1, 1975, and requested another 95% rate hike in
April, 1975. Id.
6. Prior to the enactment of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, more than 20
insurers withdrew from the Florida malpractice liability insurance market. Note, supra note 5, at
50 n.3 (citing St. Petersburg Times, Jan. 6, 1975, at BI, col. 2). The largest insurer, Argonaut
Insurance Company, threatened to withdraw from the market in 1975 if further rate increases
were not granted, but the company was temporarily restrained. Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Florida
Medical Assoc., No. 75-140 Civ. (M.D. Fla. May 19, 1975).
7. Ch. 75-9, § 14, 1975 Fla. Laws 13, 24 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.351 (Supp. 1974)).
8. FLA. STAT. § 627.353 (1975).
9. Ch. 75-9, § 4, 1975 Fla. Laws 13, 16 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.355 (1973)).
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Malpractice Insurance remains a minimal insurer, 10 the Patient's Com-
pensation Fund no longer offers coverage due to a lack of partici-
pants," l and the expanding self-insurance trust market has produced
only limited savings. 2
The 1975 Act also included substantial tort reforms. It established
medical malpractice mediation panels for prior review of malpractice
actions,"3 a four-year statute of repose for medical negligence actions
(seven-year statute of repose where fraud or concealment is shown), 14
and a statutory definition of "informed consent." 5 To reduce pretrial
publicity, the Act also eliminated "ad damnum" clauses so the plain-
tiff was no longer required to state the amount of damages claimed.
16
While the mediation panels eventually were declared unconstitu-
tional, 17 the concept of providing pre-suit screening has been continu-
ously resurrected and forms an important part of the 1988
legislation. 8 The statutes of repose and the laws governing "informed
consent" have undergone only minor changes since their enactment in
1975.19 The prohibition against pleading the amount of general dam-
ages through the elimination of the "ad damnum" clause remains in
effect .
20
10. Based on premiums paid in 1985, the Joint Underwriting Association had an estimated
5.5% share of the medical malpractice insurance market. ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, FI-
NANCIAL CONDITION OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE JUAs ii (June 1987) (prepared for the National
Coordinating Committee on Medical Malpractice JUAs).
11. STAFF OF FLA. S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, FLORIDA MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REFORM AND A
REVIEW OF COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION 8 (Jan. 1988) (on file with committee).
12. The rates for the Florida Physician's Protective Trust Fund, effective January 1, 1987,
ranged from $9,780 to $170,366 for a policy offering coverage of $1 million per claim per $3
million annual aggregate of claims. Rates for the largest private insurer, which became effective
six months later, ranged from $10,325 to $208,503 for the same level of coverage. Attachment to
letter from Jerome F. Vogel, Actuary, Fla. Dep't. of Ins., Bureau of Rates, to Bernard Webb,
Task Force staff member (Oct. 9, 1987) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins.).
13. Ch. 75-9, §§ 5-6, 1975 Fla. Laws 13, 17 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.133 (1975)).
14. Id. § 7, 1975 Fla. Laws at 20 (amending FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4) (Supp. 1974)).
15. FLA. STAT. § 768.132 (1975).
16. Id. § 768.042.
17. Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980). For a detailed review of the use of medi-
cal mediation panels in Florida, see Ehrhardt, One Thousand Seven Hundred Days: A History
of Medical Mediation Panels in Florida, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 165 (1980).
18. See ch. 88-1, §§ 50-53, 1988 Fla. Laws 119, 166 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 766.203-.206
(Supp. 1988)).
19. Compare FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4) (1987) with id. § 95.11(4) (1975) (relating to changes
enacted regarding statute of limitations and the statute of repose for medical negligence actions).
The medical consent law has been amended only once; the amendment changed a conclusive
presumption to a rebuttable presumption. Ch. 85-175, § 21, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1211 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 768.46 (1987)).
20. FLA. STAT. § 768.042 (1987).
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B. The 1976 Legislation
Although results from the 1975 Act could not reasonably have been
expected within one year, the 1976 Legislature concluded that the 1975
reforms were inadequate. 2' Accordingly, the 1976 Legislature re-
addressed the medical malpractice issue. Unlike the 1975 Act, the 1976
response was almost entirely in the area of tort reform. It provided
for a tighter definition of the standard of care required by a health
care provider, 22 a limitation on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor, 23 and
required itemized verdicts.2 4 The 1976 Act also provided for periodic
payment of future damages25 and reduction of awards by amounts re-
ceived from collateral sources, 26 and it codified the role of the court
under the doctrines of additur and remittitur. 27 The standard of care
adopted in the 1976 Act (that standard "recognized by a reasonably
prudent similar health care provider as being acceptable under similar
conditions and circumstances"), and the limitation of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitor, have remained intact since their inception. 2 The
other provisions, however, have been repealed or substantially modi-
fied, although similar provisions reappeared in later legislative enact-
ments .29
The 1976 Legislature also imposed on health care facilities an obli-
gation to engage in internal risk management, 0 and provided for the
creation of "medical incident" committees, through which hospital
boards determine if a compensable injury had occurred, and if it had,
21. Ch. 76-260, 1976 Fla. Laws 660, 662.
WHEREAS, despite the responsive actions of the 1975 session of the Legislature, pro-
fessional liability insurance premiums for Florida physicians have continued to rise
and, according to the best available projections, will continue to rise at a dramatic
rate, and WHEREAS, insurance companies across America are continuing to with-
draw from the medical professional liability insurance market so that such insurance,
even at exorbitant rates, is becoming virtually unavailable in the voluntary private
sector....
Id.
22. FLA. STAT. § 768.45 (Supp. 1976).
23. Id. § 768.45(4).
24. Id. § 768.48.
25. Id. § 768.51.
26. Id. § 768.50.
27. Id. § 768.49.
28. See id. § 768.45 (1987); id. § 768.45 (Supp. 1976).
29. See, e.g., id. § 768.74 (1987) (relating to additur and remittitur); id. § 768.76 (relating to
collateral sources); id. § 768.77 (relating to itemized verdicts); id. § 768.78 (relating to periodic
payment of damages).
30. Ch. 76-260, § 2, 1976 Fla. Laws 660, 664 (amending FLA. STAT. § 395.18 (1975)) (codi-
fied at FLA. STAT. § 768.41 (Supp. 1976)). Minimal risk management programs were required by
the 1975 legislation for the larger hospitals. Ch. 75-9, § 3, 1975 Fla. Laws 13, 16 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 395.18 (1975)).
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whether a physician's actions caused or contributed to the injury."
The board's decision to offer compensation to an injured patient was
binding on both the physician and the physician's insurer and could
be challenged only through a binding arbitration program. 2 If the
physician or the insurer failed to pay, the committee could pay the
award from hospital insurance funds and receive a lien against the
physician.33 Internal risk management remains part of the legislative
response to medical malpractice,- 4 however the provision for medical
incident committees, which came into being on January 1, 1977,
lasted only six months before its repeal."
C. The 1985 Legislation
The next major legislative attempt to reform the medical malprac-
tice tort system occurred in 1985A6 That legislation required witnesses
to have prior teaching or medical practice to qualify as a medical ex-
pert,37 set limitations on attorney's fees in contingency situations," di-
rected the courts to provide closer scrutiny to damage awards, and
strengthened the court's authority to reduce or increase an inappropri-
ate verdict.39 It was no longer necessary for verdicts to separate
awards for medical expenses, lost wages, and other general damages.40
Rather, verdicts distinguished only between past and future dam-
31. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.42-.43 (Supp. 1976).
32. Id. § 768.43.
33. Id.
34. See id. § 395.041 (1987).
35. Ch. 77-64, § 2, 1977 Fla. Laws 98, 100.
36. Ch. 85-175, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180. While the Legislature did adopt a major medical
malpractice package in 1977, it represented primarily a reenactment of the 1976 reforms necessi-
tated by a trial court ruling that found the legislation unconstitutional on various grounds. See
Florida Medical Malpractice Joint Underwriting Assoc. v. Shevin, No. 76-2792 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct.
Feb. 28, 1977), rev'd and remanded, 352 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1977). Additionally, to discourage
frivolous claims and encourage early resolution of meritorious claims, the 1980 legislation al-
lowed an award of attorney's fees to prevailing parties in medical malpractice actions. FLA.
STAT. § 768.56 (Supp. 1980). This provision, however, was repealed in 1985 because after ob-
taining an award, defendants were seldom able to collect it. Ch. 85-175, § 43, 1985 Fla. Laws
1180, 1225.
37. Ch. 85-175, § 10, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1195 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.45(2)(c)(2)
(1983)). This requirement does not apply to a "similar health care provider." FLA. STAT. §
768.45(2)(a)-(b) (1985).
38. FLA. STAT. § 768.595 (1985). In accordance with section 768.595(7)(a), this statute was
superseded in part by FLA. BAR RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.5(F).
39. Ch. 85-175, § 18, 1985 Fla. Laws 1180, 1207 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.49 (1983)).
The 1985 Act authorized the court to employ the doctrines of additur and remittitur where it
"appears," as opposed to "clearly appears," that the jury ignored the evidence or where the
court found that the verdict is "excessive or inadequate" as opposed to "clearly excessive or
inadequate." Id.
40. Id. § 11, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1196 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.48 (1983)).
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ages.41 The 1985 Act increased from $200,000 to $500,000 the thresh-
old of future damages that would permit the court to order payment
on a periodic basis.4 2 Also, it required an evidentiary hearing before
punitive damages could be requested.4 1
The 1985 Act also discouraged frivolous litigation by requiring the
plaintiff's attorney to reasonably investigate prior to filing a com-
plaint. 44 For example, it encouraged, but did not require, written med-
ical opinions as part of the investigative process. 45 Also, it required
plaintiffs to give ninety days' notice to potential defendants before
filing a complaint, 46 and required defendants, during the ninety-day
period, to make a reasonable investigation.4 7 This investigation, how-
ever, could be limited to review by an insurance claims examiner with-
out the assistance of medical experts .4  The pre-suit investigation
requirement was designed to encourage settlement prior to judicial in-
volvement in the litigation.4 9 With significant revision, these pre-suit
investigation provisions laid the groundwork for a major component
of the recommendations of the Task Force and the 1988 legislation. 0
The 1985 Act also established a system of voluntary binding arbitra-
tion for cases where defendants admit liability but dispute the dam-
ages. " A prospective defendant's offer to admit liability and arbitrate
the issue of damages could be conditioned on plaintiff's acceptance of
a limitation on the plea for general damages.5 2 Courts were given au-
thority to refer a medical malpractice case to nonbinding arbitration.
41. Id.
42. Id. § 13, 1985 Fla. Laws at 1197 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.51 (1983)).
43. FLA. STAT. § 768.495 (1985).
44. Id. The statute provides for a 90-day tolling of the statute of limitation upon petitioning
the clerk of court for permission to conduct the investigation. Id.
45. Id. A written medical opinion can be used as evidence to establish that a good faith
investigation was conducted. See id.
46. Id. § 768.57.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 768.57(3)(a).
49. Hawkes, The Second Reformation: Florida's Medical Malpractice Law, 13 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 744, 762 (1985).
50. The Task Force recommended that a medical expert participate in the investigation and
that a written medical expert opinion supporting the claim be obtained before the plaintiff mails
a notice of intent to initiate litigation. Similarly, the Task Force recommended that an expert
opinion supporting a defense be required prior to the defendant's or insurer's denial of the
claim. AcAEM c TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS (Nov. 6, 1987) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins. and Fla.
H.R. Comm. on Judiciary) [hereinafter TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS].
51. FLA. STAT. § 768.57 (1985).
52. Id. No specific dollar limitation is provided. The figure of $250,000 adopted in the 1988
malpractice legislation appeared in earlier drafts of the 1985 proposal, but was replaced with
general language. See Hawkes, supra note 49, at 762 n.78.
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However, both parties were free to reject the arbitrator's decision
without penalty and demand a trial de novo.5 3 Penalties could be im-
posed if an offer of judgment, or a newly created demand for judg-
ment, was unreasonably rejected. 54 The Act further required pretrial
settlement conferences in all medical malpractice cases. 5
D. The 1986 Legislation
In the following year the Legislature again abandoned the premise
that medical malpractice cases were substantially different from other
negligence cases when it extended to other negligence laws many of
the 1985 reforms, including provisions for pleading punitive damages,
providing for structured settlements, and creating a right to demand
judgment.16 However, the 1986 Act, considered in its entirety, was
more defense oriented than the legislation adopted in 1985.
The 1986 Act applied the limitation on pleading punitive damages
to all negligence cases and added a presumptive limitation on the
amount of such damages equal to three times the actual damages. 7
More detailed itemized verdicts were brought back into use, and the
court could direct the jury to distinguish not only between past and
future damages, but also between those elements of past and future
damages which represented economic rather than noneconomic dam-
ages.5 Provisions governing periodic payments were limited to future
economic damages rather than all future damages, apparently in re-
cognition of the fact that future noneconomic damages are not subject
to reduction to present value.5 9 The amount of qualifying damages re-
quired for periodic payments was reduced from $500,000 to
$250,000. 60
The Legislature also adopted reforms which had not been included
in the medical malpractice legislation of 1985. It approved a $450,000
53. FLA. STAT. § 768.575 (1985).
54. Id. § 768.585. Costs and attorney's fees are awarded to the defendant if the plaintiff
fails to receive an award at trial greater than 75% of the offer of judgment and to the plaintiff if
the award is at least 12506 of the amount demanded. Although there were no sanctions for
requesting a trial de novo, a party willing to abide by an arbitration decision could invoke the
offer and demand for judgment sections to have sanctions imposed where the opposing party
unreasonably refused to comply with the decision. Id.
55. Id. § 768.58.
56. See ch. 86-160, §§ 51-58, 68, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 748, 763 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§
768.72-.79 (1987)).
57. FLA. STAT. §§ 768.73-.74 (Supp. 1986). In 1987 the limits on punitive damages were
extended to apply to actions involving misconduct in commercial transactions. See ch. 87-42,
§ 1, 1987 Fla. Laws 177, 178 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (Supp. 1986)).
58. FLA. STAT. § 768.77 (Supp. 1986).
59. Braddock v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co., 80 So. 2d 662, 668 (Fla. 1955).
60. FLA. STAT. § 768.78 (Supp. 1986).
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cap on noneconomic damages, 6' but that was declared unconstitu-
tional prior to implementation. 62 The 1986 Act abrogated the doctrine
of joint and several liability with respect to noneconomic damages in
cases where total damages exceeded $25,000. 63 Additionally, with re-
gard to economic damages, it applied joint and several liability only to
a defendant whose percentage of fault equalled or exceeded the plain-
tiff's.64
The 1986 Act also was known for substantial insurance reforms de-
signed to hold down increases in liability insurance rates. 65 Its most
important provision, however, at least in relation to medical malprac-
tice actions, was the creation of the Task Force. 66
E. The 1987 Legislation
The 1987 Legislature enacted some revisions of the tort system even
though the 1986 Act was passed on the premise that further reforms
would be postponed until the Task Force completed its review of the
tort system and reported to the Legislature. 67 The enactments related
to offers of settlement and alternative dispute resolution. Like the
1986 provisions, they were directed to the tort system as a whole, and
served as a further indication of legislative interest in encouraging the
early amicable settlement of claims. 68
The adoption of a demand for judgment provision was intended to
even the playing field between plaintiffs and defendants by permitting
61. Id. § 768.80.
62. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
63. FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (Supp. 1986).
64. Id.
65. Among the findings of the Legislature in adopting The Reform and Insurance Act of
1986 was a determination that "the tort law and the liability insurance system are interdependent
and interrelated" and therefore a need existed for reform of both the insurance regulatory stat-
utes and the tort law of Florida. See ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 699.
66. The Task Force was established to conduct a scholarly review of the insurance and tort
laws of Florida and other jurisdictions. Id. § 13, 1986 Fla. Laws at 756. On November 6, 1987,
the Task Force made recommendations to the Legislature for reform in the area of medical
malpractice. These recommendations formed the basis for the 1988 legislative response to the
medical malpractice issue.
67. See FLA. STAT. §§ 45.061-.062 (1987) (governing offers of settlement); id. ch. 44 (allow-
ing court-ordered mediation, court-ordered nonbinding arbitration, and voluntary binding arbi-
tration.)
68. Id. Sections 44.303 and 45.061 permit assessment of costs and attorney's fees against a
party who unreasonably proceeds to trial. In a de novo hearing in arbitration, the requesting
party must obtain a more favorable result than that obtained in arbitration. Where there is an
offer of settlement, that offer shall be presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by a defen-
dant if the judgment entered is at least 25% greater than the offer rejected, and an offer shall be
presumed to have been unreasonably rejected by plaintiff if the judgment entered is at least 25%
less than the offer rejected. Id. § 45.061.
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the plaintiff an opportunity to receive the benefit of sanctions im-
posed for the unreasonable rejection of an offer. However, the defen-
dant remained in a position of having to admit to the entry of a
judgment determining liability in either case. To remove this stigma of
admitted liability, the 1987 Legislature extended the sanctions to cases
where an offer of settlement made by either party was unreasonably
rejected. 69 In this manner, both parties were further encouraged to
reach out-of-court settlements, physicians were not required to submit
to the entry of a finding of liability, and no public record of the
amount of the settlement would be created.
In establishing a voluntary binding arbitration program under
which parties could agree to arbitrate existing disputes, the Legislature
sought to provide an alternative forum for the parties to settle their
dispute. However, before a physician or a physician's insurer could
offer to arbitrate, the arbitration provisions adopted in 1987 first re-
quired an admission of liability. 70 The 1987 Act also permitted both
parties to agree in writing to submit their disputes to binding arbitra-
tion. 71 Courts also were given the authority to refer disputes either to
nonbinding arbitration or to mediation.72 If the court ordered non-
binding arbitration, sanctions would be imposed on a party seeking a
trial de novo if the judgment obtained in the trial was not more favor-
able to the requesting party than the arbitration order.7 1 Court referral
to mediation or nonbinding arbitration, however, was limited to judi-
cial circuits in which an appropriate program was available. 74
II. TASK FORCE: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Task Force created by the 1986 legislation 75 consisted of five
members: three designated by the legislation and two appointed by the
designated members. 76 The three designated members were university
Presidents Marshall M. Criser of the University of Florida, Bernard
F. Sliger of the Florida State University, and Edward T. Foote, II, of
the University of Miami. The two appointed members were business-
69. Id. § 45.061.
70. Id. § 768.57(3)(b)(3).
71. Id. § 44.304. Presumably, before providing elective care and possibly emergency treat-
ment, health care practitioners could require patients to agree to submit any claim arising from
the treatment to binding arbitration.
72. Id. §§ 44.302-.303.
73. Id. § 44.303(5).
74. Id. 99 44.302(1), .303(1).
75. See supra note 66.
76. Id.
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men Preston H. Haskell of Jacksonville and P. Scott Linder of Lake-
land.7
The Task Force was charged with the responsibility of studying the
issues of affordability and availability of liability insurance, as well as
the efficacy of previous legislative attempts to reform the tort and lia-
bility insurance systems .7  The Task Force members assembled a re-
search staff of experts in law, insurance, and medicine 9 which
conducted an extensive empirical analysis of Florida's liability insur-
ance and tort systems.8 0 Although initially scheduled to provide its
findings and recommendations to the Legislature by March 1, 1988,
Governor Martinez requested the Task Force to provide findings and
recommendations in the area of medical malpractice on an accelerated
schedule in preparation for a special legislative session on medical
malpractice.81
In response to the Governor's request, the Task Force produced
two major reports on medical malpractice: the Preliminary Fact-Find-
ing Report on Medical Malpractice82 and Medical Malpractice Recom-
mendations.83 Since the Legislature relied heavily on the Task Force's
77. ACADEMIC TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS, ADMINIS-
TRATiVE REPORT 2 (March 30, 1988) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT].
78. See id.
79. Members of the Task Force research staff participating in the Preliminary Fact-Finding
Report on Medical Malpractice and the formulation of medical malpractice recommendations
included: Executive Director Carl S. Hawkins, Professor and former Dean, Brigham Young
University Law School; Associate Director Donald G. Gifford, Professor of Law, University of
Florida; Dr. David J. Nye, Associate Professor of Finance and Insurance, University of Florida;
Joseph W. Little, Professor of Law, University of Florida; Dr. Roger G. Blair, Professor of
Economics, University of Florida; Bernard L. Webb, Professor of Actuarial Science, Risk Man-
agement and Insurance, Georgia State University; and Marvin A. Dewar, M.D., practicing phy-
sician and law student. ADMINISTRATIVE REPORT, supra note 77, at 2-3.
80. This Article focuses on the findings and recommendations of the Task Force that relate
to medical malpractice; however, the scope of the Task Force's investigations and recommenda-
tions was not limited to medical malpractice. The findings and recommendations in areas of
liability insurance and tort law, other than medical malpractice, can be found in two publica-
tions: (1) ACADEMIC TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS, FINAL
FACT-FINDING REPORT ON INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS (March 1, 1988), and (2) ACADEMIC
TASK FORCE FOR REVIEW OF THE INSURANCE AND TORT SYSTEMS, FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS
(March 1, 1988).
81. Several events led to the perceived need for a special legislative session on medical mal-
practice. Late in 1986, the state's three largest medical malpractice insurers disclosed plans to
increase premium rates by as much as 35%. In response, some physicians, particularly in South
Florida, began curtailing high-risk services. The most publicized episodes involved emergency
rooms closing or curtailing services. See Nordheimer, Doctors Withhold Services in Protest of
Insurance, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1986, at A25, col. 1; Florida Hospitals Curtail Services as
Doctors Protest Insurance Costs, N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1987, at D14, col. 1; Hospitals in Florida
Cut Certain Services as Protest Continues, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1987, at 8, col. 3.
82. TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2.
83. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50.
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findings in formulating the 1988 legislative response to medical mal-
practice, the factual findings and recommendations of the Task Force
will be reviewed here.
A. Factual Findings
The Task Force conducted an extensive analysis of data relating to
the medical malpractice and liability insurance systems. This investiga-
tive effort included state-wide public hearings and a comprehensive
review of the relevant literature84 Additionally, the Task Force re-
search team conducted several original research projects designed to
collect Florida-specific data on medical malpractice and liability insur-
ance. 5 These investigations led to a series of specific factual findings
on the medical malpractice and liability insurance system in Florida.16
The findings can be grouped as follows: (1) findings regarding the lia-
bility insurance industry; (2) findings regarding the civil justice sys-
tem; and (3) findings regarding the medical profession.
1. Liability Insurance Industry
The Task Force's factual findings regarding the liability insurance
industry are the result of an exhaustive analysis of paid medical mal-
practice claims from 1977 through 1986 and an analysis of insurance
company finances.8 7 The Task Force found that between 1983 and
1986, the cost of medical malpractice insurance rose substantially,
both in absolute terms and when compared to physicians' gross reven-
ues.8 8 The increase was most dramatic for physicians in South Florida,
with obstetricians & gynecologists in Dade and Broward counties ex-
periencing an average annual premium increase of 45.7%o.89 Although
medical malpractice insurance was costly, no evidence existed that
physicians were unable to obtain insurance coverage during the study
period. 90
84. TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 2-3.
85. The original research projects included: (1) a survey of all closed malpractice claims
paid from 1975 to 1986 (a closed claim is a claim which has either been settled, dropped or
litigated to a conclusion); (2) a survey of companies offering liability insurance in Florida; (3) an
investigation of insurance company finances; (4) a survey of Florida physicians; (5) a survey of
Florida attorneys; and (6)an analysis of civil litigation rates in Florida. Id. at 3.
86. TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 6-17.
87. Id. at 23-24.
88. Id. at 26-36.
89. Id. at 30.
90. Id. at 37-43. The Task Force recognized the possibility that liability insurance, though
technically available, could become so costly as to be "functionally unavailable." Id. at 37.
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The Task Force determined that the substantial rise in the cost of
medical liability insurance resulted from a sustained increase in the
total amount of malpractice claims paid. 9' This increase in loss pay-
ments was produced by an increase in both the number of claims paid
and the amount paid per claim.92 From 1975 to 1986 the average paid
medical malpractice claim grew at a compound average rate of nearly
15%.91 During the same period, the frequency of paid claims increased
at an annual compound rate of almost 5V0 .94 As a result of this in-
crease in claims' severity and frequency, the Task Force determined
that total medical malpractice claims paid from 1975 to 1986 grew at a
compound rate in excess of 20076 per year. 95
A frequently heard assertion during discussions on the medical mal-
practice insurance crisis was that, despite claims to the contrary, lia-
bility insurers enjoy inordinate profits from medical malpractice
liability policies. 96 However, the Task Force's study of the medical
malpractice liability insurance industry in Florida does not support
that assertion. Based upon a 1987 study conducted by the Insurance
Services Office, the Task Force concluded that the profitability of
medical malpractice insurers was comparable to the profitability of
the average U.S. industrial and financial institution for the period of
1977 to 1985. 97 Although liability insurance company profitability var-
ied substantially on a yearly basis due to changes in the underwriting
cycle and premium investment returns, the Task Force concluded that
excess malpractice liability insurer profitability was not a major cause
of rising premiums during the study period.98
However, the Task Force found that the insurance industry practice
of setting premium rates by dividing Florida physicians into a limited
number of "risk classifications," determined by specialty and geo-
graphic location, contributed to affordability problems experienced by
some high-risk specialties." Apparently, the limited number of medi-
91. Id. at44.
92. Id. at 49. The Task Force studied both the frequency and size of loss payments, but did
not attempt to establish whether payments under existing liability rules, or whether the existing
liability rules themselves, were appropriate. Id.
93. Id. at 128.
94. Id. at 126. The frequency of claims reported in South Florida was twice that reported
by the rest of the state. Additionally, certain medical specialties, such as orthopedics and obstet-
rics & gynecology, accounted for increasing proportions of paid claims. Id. at 118-24.
95. Id. at 44-46. The compound annual growth rate since 1979 was more than 30%. Id.
96. See, e.g., Horwitz, Nader Charges Insurers with Price-Gouging, Wash. Post, Jan. 7,
1986, at Dl, col. 6 (insurers are "price-gouging the public").
97. TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 53-57.
98. Id. at 8-9.
99. Id. at 10-11, 97-108.
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cal practitioners in the high-risk classifications such as obstetrics &
gynecology and neurosurgery fails to provide enough cost spreading
to mitigate the heavy loss experiences of these specialties. Conse-
quently, physicians in high-risk specialties face malpractice insurance
premiums many times greater than physicians in low-risk specialties.'0
Additionally, the Task Force examined the possibility that the rela-
tively small number of firms writing medical malpractice insurance in
Florida created a monopoly situation resulting in insufficient competi-
tion and high premiums. Despite finding that eighty percent of the
medical malpractice liability insurance in Florida was underwritten by
four firms,' 0 the Task Force determined that market monopoly condi-
tions are not a substantial cause of the increased cost of medical mal-
practice insurance. 112
2. Civil Justice System
The Task Force also considered the possible contribution of
changes in the tort system to rising malpractice insurance premiums.
The Task Force's evaluation included an analysis of closed medical
malpractice claims, l03 an evaluation of civil litigation rates, 1°4 and a
100. Id. at 27. Family physicians in Dade and Broward counties paid an average of $19,415
in 1987 for liability insurance. Family physicians in the rest of the state paid an average of
$10,277. In contrast, neurosurgeons in Dade and Broward counties paid an average annual pre-
mium of $192,420, while Florida's neurosurgeons practicing outside the Dade/Broward area
paid an average of $102,339 annually for malpractice coverage. Id.
101. Id. at 64-73. Although this represents a high degree of market concentration, Florida
ranks thirty-fifth when compared to other states as to the degree of concentration of the mal-
practice insurance market. Id. at 68-72.
102. Id. at 8-9, 73-86. The Task Force staff examined the following factors to evaluate the
difficulty of entering the Florida medical malpractice insurance market: statutory and regulatory
requirements; business considerations; and legal environment considerations. The Task Force
concluded that these factors did not make it unduly difficult to enter Florida's insurance market.
Id. at 80-83.
103. The analysis of closed medical malpractice claims involved consideration of data pro-
vided by the Florida Department of Insurance. In 1974, Florida enacted legislation which re-
quired insurance carriers to report information on medical malpractice claims to the Florida
Department of Insurance. FLA. STAT. § 627.912 (1987). As a result of this requirement, the De-
partment of Insurance received more than 21,000 claims reports between 1975 and 1986. For an
analysis of the Florida Department of Insurance medical malpractice closed claims data set, see
Nye, Gifford, Webb & Dewar, The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis of
Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1537-60 (1988) [hereinafter
An Analysis of Claims Data].
104. Florida civil litigation rates were analyzed using data obtained from the State Courts
Administrator's Office. A comparison of Florida's civil litigation rates with national rates can be
found in Gifford & Nye, Litigation Trends in Florida: Saga of a Growth State, 39 U. FLA. L.
REV. 829 (1987).
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survey of Florida lawyers.105 The Task Force found that medical mal-
practice tort system transaction costs (litigation costs and attorney's
fees) increased substantially from 1975 to 1986.106 Changes in the rules
of medical malpractice tort law, however, were not entirely responsi-
ble for the large increases in the cost of medical malpractice liability
insurance during this period. 107 Unfortunately, data sufficient to de-
termine changes in the number of medical malpractice tort lawsuits
filed in Florida over the study period were not available. 0
8
Opponents of the medical malpractice tort system frequently com-
plain that it is an inefficient mechanism for compensating the victims
of medical maloccurrences.' °9 They argue that the operation of the
tort system itself, in the form of litigation costs and attorney's fees,
consumes an inordinate amount of resources. Indeed, the Task Force
found that only 43%o of the total insurance company expenditures for
medical malpractice in 1985 actually was paid to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs'
legal costs constituted more than 2170 of the total expenditures, while
defense costs consumed 18%. The cost of defending a medical mal-
practice claim grew at an annual rate of 17%70 between 1975 and
1986.110
Though increases in the cost of defending medical malpractice
claims could be responsible for some of the increase in liability insur-
ance costs, the Task Force was unable to document a correlation be-
tween particular changes in substantive medical malpractice tort law
and increased liability insurance costs."' Changes in Florida's mal-
practice liability rules since 1970 have not been either pro-plaintiff or
pro-defendant. However, the expansion of the standard of care in
medical malpractice cases from a local to a national standard, and the
use of tort doctrines such as res ipsa loquitor, have altered the medical
105. The Task Force staff conducted a survey of 1,500 Florida attorneys who practice tort
law. The survey included an equal number of plaintiff and defense attorneys and was designed to
elicit information about the attorney's individual practice as well as perceptions about the tort
system in general. See TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 216 n.224.
106. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
108. TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 150-51. The medical malpractice
closed claims database includes information on all medical malpractice insurance claims since
1975 which resulted in a lawsuit, as well as claims which were resolved without a lawsuit being
filed. See An Analysis of Claims Data, supra note 103. On the other hand, the State Courts
Administrator's Office did not begin collecting data on the actual number of medical malprac-
tice lawsuits filed until 1986. TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 150.
109. See P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 187-207 (1985).
110. TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 198.
111. Id. at 188-89.
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malpractice tort law rules in a pro-plaintiff manner." 2 On the other
hand, the Legislature made several forays into the field of medical
malpractice tort law in an apparent attempt to limit the tort liability
of health care providers. Examples of defense-oriented changes in tort
rules include statutory limitations on the measure of damages in medi-
cal malpractice actions and the creation of conditions precedent to the
filing of medical malpractice lawsuits." 3
3. Medical Profession
The Task Force evaluated the relationship of the medical profession
to the malpractice tort system. This evaluation included an analysis of
malpractice claims records of individual health care providers and dif-
ferent medical specialties. Additionally, the Task Force conducted a
survey of Florida physicians to ascertain their impressions of the med-
ical malpractice tort system and the effects of tort liability on the
practice of medicine. The Task Force did not attempt to evaluate indi-
vidual medical malpractice claims and, therefore, did not make judg-
ments as to the merit of particular claims.
Analysis of closed medical malpractice claims revealed a significant
disparity in the distribution of claims among individual physicians and
112. Id. at 159-70. The standard of care for a Florida health care provider practicing as a
"specialist" is determined by reference to other health care providers practicing in the same
specialty. FLA. STAT. § 768.45(2)(b) (1987). Health care providers not certified as specialists are
held to a standard of care that is determined by reference to "similar health care providers"
licensed in Florida. Id. § 768.45(2)(a). Res ipsa loquitor is a tort rule which allows juries to infer
a defendant's negligence under certain circumstances. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, TORTS § 39
(5th ed. 1984). Florida courts have permitted limited use of res ipsa loquitor in medical malprac-
tice actions. See e.g. Marrero v. Goldsmith, 486 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1986); Chenoweth v. Kemp,
396 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 1981); Benigno v. Cypress Community Hosp., 386 So. 2d 1303 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1980).
113. Several statutes limit the recovery of damages in medical malpractice cases. For exam-
ple, punitive damages are limited to three times the sum of compensatory damages and 60076 of
any punitive damage award is paid to the state rather than to the plaintiff. See FLA. STAT. §
768.73 (1987). An attempt to limit by statute noneconomic damages in negligence actions, in-
cluding medical malpractice actions, to $450,000 was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court of Florida. Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987). For a discussion
supporting the constitutionality of the proposed cap on noneconomic damages see Note, The
Constitutionality of Florida's Cap on Noneconomic Damages in the Tort Reform and Insurance
Act of 1986, 39 U. FLA. L. REv. 157 (1987).
An example of a statutory condition precedent to filing a medical malpractice lawsuit is the
requirement that lawyers make a "reasonable investigation" before filing a claim sufficient to
create a "good faith belief" that adequate grounds exist for the claim. FLA. STAT. § 768.495(1)
(1987). Additionally, plaintiffs are required to provide defendants with 90-day notice before fil-
ing a medical malpractice action in order to encourage pre-suit investigation and settlement. Id.
§ 768.57(3)(a). In 1975, an attempt to require that medical malpractice cases proceed through
mediation proceedings before trial was declared unconstitutional as applied. Aldana v. Holub,
381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980). For an extensive discussion of the Florida experience with mandatory
medical mediation panels, see Ehrhardt, supra note 17.
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medical specialties. High-risk medical specialties, such as orthopedics
and obstetrics & gynecology, experienced paid claims at a rate two to
three times the statewide average for all medical specialties com-
bined. 14 Medical specialties that accounted for an increasing propor-
tion of paid claims from 1975 to 1986 include orthopedics, obstetrics
& gynecology, and emergency medicine.I 5
With respect to the distribution of medical malpractice claims
among individual physicians, the Task Force encountered a similar
disparity. Of the 5,503 medical malpractice claims from 1975 to 1986
that resulted in an indemnity payment, physicians with a single paid
claim accounted for 79%.116 Of the remaining claims, physicians with
two paid claims accounted for 14%." Even more striking is the com-
parison between the number of paid claims per physician and the total
amount of indemnity payments made during the study period. The
867 physicians (approximately 4% of the physicians in Florida) with
two or more paid claims accounted for 42% of the more than $500
million paid out in medical malpractice indemnity payments between
1975 and 1986.11 s The Task Force was careful not to imply that physi-
cians with multiple claims necessarily were "bad doctors;" 9 however,
114. TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 115-18. In 1985, the rate of paid
medical malpractice claims in Florida was 3.54 per 100 physicians. The rates for orthopedic and
obstetric & gynecologic specialists were 9.99 and 8.05 per 100 physicians, respectively. In con-
trast, a relatively low-risk specialty, such as internal medicine, experienced a claims rate of 1.21
per 100 physicians. Id.
115. Id. at 123. The increases were most dramatic for orthopedics and emergency medicine.
Emergency medicine accounted for only 0.80o of all closed claims in 1975; by 1982 emergency
medicine accounted for 8.90o of all closed claims. Some specialties, most notably general prac-
tice, general surgery, and anesthesiology, experienced a decline in their relative proportion of
total closed medical malpractice claims. Id. This pattern of redistribution among medical spe-
cialties is at least partially attributable to shifts in physician demographics during the study pe-
riod. For example, from 1970 to 1982, the percentage of physicians classified as obstetricians &
gynecologists increased 480o and the percentage classified as orthopedic surgeons increased 68%.
During the same time period, the percentage of physicians classified as general or family physi-
cians decreased by 0.1%. AMERICAN MED. Ass'N COUNCIL OF LONG RANGE PLANNING & DEV.,
TE ENVIRONSMENT OF MEDICINE 44 (1985). Altered physician demographics do not completely
explain the changes in specialty distribution of malpractice closed claims. This is demonstrated
by the fact that the specialty of anesthesiology experienced a decreased claims' rate despite a
67% increase in representation in relative physician supply. Id. For the suggestion that the de-
creased claims' rate among anesthesiologists represents an increase in the quality of care deliv-
ered by the specialty, see Gellhorn, Medical Malpractice Litigation (U.S.)-Medical Mishap
Compensation (N.Z.), 73 CORNELL L. REV. 170, 186 n.46 (1988).
116. TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 145.
117. Id. The dubious distinction of having the greatest number of paid claims went to a
physician with 34.
118. Id. at 146.
119. Id. at 142-43. Incompetence is a potential cause of physicians with multiple claims.
Other potential causes of multiple claims include practice in a high-risk medical specialty or a
high-risk geographical location. The specialties with the largest numbers of physicians with mul-
tiple claims were obstetrics & gynecology, orthopedics, general surgery, and general practice. Id.
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the clustering of a large percentage of the paid claims among a rela-
tively small group of physicians does suggest that regulatory reform
could have an impact on the medical malpractice problem . 20
The Task Force recognized that any evaluation of medical malprac-
tice needed to include an analysis of the effect of professional liability
on the medical profession. Accordingly, the Task Force surveyed
Florida physicians to evaluate the following aspects of the medical
malpractice system: (1) financial effects on physicians; (2) effects on
health care costs; and (3) alterations in patterns of health care deliv-
ery.
The survey indicates that both the absolute cost of professional lia-
bility insurance and liability insurance premium costs as a percentage
of physicians' gross income increased steadily from 1971 to 1987.121
For the insurance policy year 1971 to 1972, physicians paid a mean
liability premium of $4,645, representing 4.2% of gross practice re-
venues. By policy year 1986 to 1987, the mean liability premium in-
creased to $23,747, and absorbed an estimated 11.6% of physicians'
gross revenues.1 22 The Task Force concluded that liability insurance
was an increasing financial burden to physicians generally, and "[fior
some... so costly as to be 'functionally unavailable." 1 23
In response to increased liability premiums, physicians absorbed
some of the added costs and shifted the remainder to consumers by
increasing fees for health services. Of the physicians responding to the
120. The Florida Department of Professional Regulation (DPR) is responsible for regulating
the medical profession. Section 627.912(3), Florida Statutes (1987), requires that the Department
of Insurance notify DPR of any physician who experiences more that three paid medical mal-
practice claims, each exceeding $10,000, in a period of five years. The Task Force determined
that DPR had investigated 36 physicians on this basis since November 1985. Of these, only five
investigations resulted in some type of disciplinary action against the physician involved. TASK
FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 231. These statistics suggest that vigorous regula-
tion of the medical profession might reduce the number and size of malpractice indemnity pay-
ments. For an assertion that regulatory deficiencies are the key to the medical malpractice crises,
see WOLFE, BERGMAN & SILVER, MEDICAL MALI'RACTICE: THE NEED FOR DISCIPLINARY REFORM,
NOT TORT REFORM, PUBLIC CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP REPORT (1985); Relman, Profes-
sional Regulation and the State Medical Boards, 312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 784, 785 (1985).
121. TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 236-39. The Task Force's findings
in this regard are consistent with the findings of other investigators. Compare Kirchner, Is Your
Practice Begging for Money?, MED. ECON., Nov. 12, 1984, at 214, 230 (U.S. physicians in 1983
spent between 1.3% and 5.8% of gross practice income on professional liability insurance) with
UNITED STATES GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A FRAMeWORK FOR ACTION
2 (1987) (insurance costs as a percentage of gross business expenses for physicians grew from 8%
in 1983 to 10% in 1985).
122. TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 237. The increases in the absolute
and relative cost of liability insurance demonstrate a striking variation across medical specialties-.
For example, although the average physician expended 11.60o of gross practice revenues for
liability insurance, the figure for obstetricians & gynecologists was 23.1%. Id.
123. Id. at 239-40.
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Task Force survey, sixty-six percent reported increasing health care
fees in response to rising liability premiums. Physicians estimated that
the cost of liability insurance was responsible for thirty-four percent
of their total fee increases.'
2 4
The Task Force also considered the possibility that physicians'
health care delivery patterns have been altered by the medical mal-
practice system. Eighty percent of physicians reported ordering more
diagnostic testing as a result of concern about medical malpractice.
Increased diagnostic testing induced by concern over medical malprac-
tice may indicate that negligent behavior is being deterred; however,
increased testing motivated by fear of professional liability-not justi-
fied by sound medical principles-represents an undesirable effect of
the medical malpractice system.' 25 In addition to increased diagnostic
testing, physicians reported increased consultations, maintaining more
detailed records and providing more comprehensive informed consent
as a result of concern about medical malpractice.' 26 Over half of the
physicians reported being more selective in the patients they treat and
less willing to care for patients with "difficult" medical problems.
Eighteen percent of physicians indicated an unwillingness to see emer-
gency room or trauma patients because of liability concerns. 12 7
B. Medical Malpractice Recommendations of the Task Force
On the basis of the factual findings discussed above, the Task Force
forwarded several specific recommendations to the Florida Legisla-
ture. 128 The Task Force recommended reforming the medical malprac-
tice tort system as well as strengthening the medical regulatory system.
Additionally, the Task Force proposed a mechanism by which physi-
124. Id. at 240. A recent study attempted to identify the relationship between the cost of
professional liability insurance and the cost of various health services. The study concluded that
20% to 25% of the cost of a routine office visit to a physician and an electrocardiogram analysis
was attributable to the cost of professional liability insurance. The study also concluded that
36% of the cost of a hysterectomy and 43% of the cost of routine obstetric care was attributable
to liability insurance costs. See Reynolds, Rizzo & Gonzalez, The Cost of Medical Professional
Liability, 257 J. A.M.A. 2776 (1987) [hereinafter Medical Professional Liability].
125. TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 242-44. See generally Hermis, De-
fensive Medicine: It Costs, But Does It Work?, 257 J. A.M.A. 2801 (1987) (asserting that each
$1 increase in liability premiums generates an estimated $3.50 in defensive medicine costs); Medi-
cal Professional Liability, supra note 124, at 2781 (suggesting that the annual cost of defensive
medicine nationally approaches $13.7 billion); Zuckerman, Koller & Bovberg, Information on
Malpractice: A Review of Empirical Research on Major Policy Issues, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 85, 99 (1986) (increased diagnostic testing justified in terms of cost/benefit analysis is
desirable).
126. TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 244.
127. Id. at 248.
128. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50.
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cians who experience financial difficulty due to liability insurance
premiums could obtain temporary relief. Since these recommenda-
tions served as the starting point for the Legislature's consideration of
the medical malpractice problem, they are summarized below.
1. Prompt Resolution of Claims Plan
The principal civil justice reform advanced by the Task Force is en-
titled the Prompt Resolution of Meritorious Medical Negligence
Claims Plan. 129 The Plan combines two basic proposals: (1) as a pre-
liminary matter, both plaintiffs and defendants should be required to
conduct pre-suit investigations and to document that reasonable
grounds exist for initiating or denying a malpractice claim; and (2)
incentives should be provided for plaintiffs and defendants to encour-
age the parties to settle disputes through voluntary binding arbitra-
tion.
The prompt investigation portion of the Task Force's proposal
would require a qualified expert's written corroborating opinion to ac-
company the filing of both claims and defenses. Penalties would be
imposed on both plaintiff and defendant who fail to comply with the
pre-suit reasonable investigation requirements. 130 The driving goal be-
hind the prompt investigation portion of the Task Force's plan is to
promote an early distinction between meritorious and nonmeritorious
claims, thus permitting claims to be settled earlier and transaction
costs to be reduced.1 3 1
Once the early investigation requirements were satisfied, the plan
would allow either the plaintiff or the defendant to offer to resolve
the claim by submitting to voluntary binding arbitration. 132 If the par-
ties agreed to arbitrate, the arbitration panel would determine only the
amount of damages the plaintiff is entitled to recover. Under this pro-
posal, the defendant's offer to arbitrate would not be considered an
admission of liability; however, it would constitute a binding commit-
129. Id. at 15-27.
130. Id. at 19. The Task Force proposed that: (1) plaintiffs filing claims without obtaining a
corroborating expert opinion should have their claims dismissed and attorney's fees and court
costs assessed against them; and (2) defendants answering a complaint by denying it, without
first obtaining a corroborating expert opinion, should have their answer stricken and be assessed
court costs and attorney's fees. Additionally, the Task Force proposed that attorneys filing
claims without complying with pre-suit screening requirements be subject to disciplinary pro-
ceedings by The Florida Bar. Likewise, physicians providing written opinions without reasonable
investigation should be subject to discipline by the Department of Professional Regulation. Id.
at 19-20.
131. Id. at 15-16.
132. Id. at 21-27.
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ment to pay the plaintiff the damages awarded by the arbitration
panel. On the other hand, if the plaintiff submits to arbitration, the
damage award determined by the arbitration board would be the ex-
clusive avenue of recovery. 3 '
Certain incentives are built into the Task Force's plan to encourage
the parties to submit meritorious claims to binding arbitration. The
plaintiff's incentive to submit a claim to binding arbitration is the
right to a damage award without having to prove fault. Additionally,
submitting claims to arbitration avoids much of the delay and the high
transaction costs involved in pursuing a claim through the courts. 3 4
The incentive for defendants to submit to binding arbitration is pro-
vided by conditional limitations placed on noneconomic damage
awards. For cases submitted to arbitration, the Task Force proposed
that noneconomic damages be limited in each case to a maximum of
$250,000, calculated as a percentage of the plaintiff's estimated loss of
capacity to enjoy the amenities of life.'35
Where a defendant offers to submit to binding arbitration but the
plaintiff declines the offer, the case would proceed to trial with a
$350,000 cap on noneconomic damages.'1 If a defendant refuses a
plaintiff's arbitration offer, the case would proceed to trial without
any damage caps. A plaintiff prevailing at trial in this situation would
be entitled to prejudgment interest and an award of reasonable attor-
ney's fees. 137
2. No-Fault Plan for Birth-Related Neurological Injuries
(BRNI)
The second major reform that the Task Force advanced is a pro-
posal to compensate on a no-fault basis infants who receive severe
neurological injuries during the birth process. 38 The decision to treat
133. Id. at 21-23.
134. Id. at 11.
135. Id. at 22.
136. Id. at 17. The Task Force considered the potential constitutional dimensions of the caps
on noneconomic damages. The caps in the Prompt Resolution of Meritorious Medical Negli-
gence Claims Plan were distinguished from the $450,000 absolute cap on noneconomic damages
declared unconstitutional in Smith v. Department of Insurance, 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
Under the Prompt Resolution Plan, the plaintiff's quid pro quo for the imposition of the cap is
the opportunity to receive damages as determined at arbitration without having to prove the
defendant's negligence. The damage cap is imposed only when the plaintiff is first offered this
opportunity but refuses it.
137. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 17.
138. Id. at 30-34. The Task Force recommendation is based on 1987 Virginia legislation. See
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -.5021 (1988). For further discussion of the Virginia legislation
and the similar legislation adopted in Florida, see infra notes 353-423 and accompanying text.
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birth-related neurological injuries differently from other medical mal-
occurrences flowed from evidence that the costs of the medical mal-
practice system are particularly high in obstetrics. 3 9 In addition, the
plaintiffs in obstetrical cases often are infants with substantial inju-
ries. This plan would provide guaranteed compensation for a class of
severely injured infants in need of assistance.
The BRNI plan is a "designated compensable event" no-fault plan
that provides automatic scheduled compensation to all claimants who
meet entry requirements.140 The Task Force proposed that the com-
pensable event for the BRNI plan would be:
injury to the brain or spinal cord of an infant caused by the
deprivation of oxygen or mechanical injury occurring in the course
of labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate post-natal period
... render[ing] the infant permanently nonambulatory, aphasic,
incontinent, and in need of assistance in all phases of daily living. 41
The Task Force proposed that an administrative agency (the Divi-
sion of Workers' Compensation) determine the eligibility of claimants
and administer the plan.142
For eligible infants, the Task Force recommended that this plan be
the sole remedy for the injuries sustained. Compensation would be
limited to net economic losses. 43 Physician participation in the BRNI
plan would be voluntary for hospitals and obstetricians.' 44 Obstetri-
cians and hospitals who elect to participate in the plan would be re-
quired to provide to patients notice of their involvement. 45 The
damages awarded under this proposal would be funded by assess-
ments against physicians and participating hospitals. 146
3. Regulatory Reform
Along with recommendations for reforms in the medical malprac-
tice tort and insurance systems, the Task Force made specific propos-
139. See supra notes 94, 99, 114-15, 122, and accompanying text.
140. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 31-32.
141. Id. This definition was taken verbatim from the Virginia statute. VA. CODE ANN. §
38.2-5001 (1988).
142. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 33.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 34. This is the same approach taken by the Virginia plan. The no-fault remedy is
available only to infants whose medical care is provided by a participating physician. Infants
who receive similar injuries and who are under the care of non-participating physicians must rely
on existing tort law for a remedy. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5008(2)-(5) (1988). The Task Force's
suggestion that participating physicians notify their patients is a departure from the Virginia
legislation. See id.
146. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 33.
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als aimed at strengthening the regulation of health care providers.
Prompting these recommendations was evidence that paid malpractice
claims have been clustered among a relatively small number of health
care providers.147 The goal of regulatory reform is to reduce the total
costs of the medical malpractice system by reducing the number of
medical maloccurrences.141
The Task Force recommended that the Florida Department of Pro-
fessional Regulation (DPR) create a Division of Medical Quality As-
surance responsible for licensure of health care providers as well as
quality assurance and professional discipline. 49 The Division of Medi-
cal Quality Assurance would coordinate health care provider quality
assurance and discipline at both the state and local levels. Grievance
committees composed of local physicians would be established on
county or district levels. Complaints against health care providers
would be screened by these local bodies, and findings and recommen-
dations would be forwarded to the Division of Medical Quality Assur-
ance for further action. Participants in this peer review process would
be provided with civil and antitrust immunity for their actions. 150
To ensure that the Division of Medical Quality Assurance would be
adequately funded, the Task Force suggested that physician licensing
fees be substantially increased.' 5' The Task Force proposed that DPR
evaluate the following additional regulatory reforms to determine
their desirability: (1) increasing the residency training requirement for
initial medical licensure; (2) raising the requirements for continuing
medical education; and (3) consideration of periodic relicensure exam-
inations. 5 2 Finally, the Task Force recommended that the "clear and
convincing evidence" standard of proof for DPR disciplining of
health care providers be changed to a "preponderance of the evi-
dence" standard. 153
147. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
148. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 37.
149. Id. at 40-44. Before the Department of Professional Regulation existed, the regulation
of health care providers was allocated to several different divisions. The Division of Professions
was responsible for the licensing and discipline of health care providers as well as over 30 other
professions. The Division of Regulation was responsible for investigating and processing com-
plaints against health care providers. The Task Force concluded that establishing a specialized
division, responsible for only health care, would strengthen DPR's ability to ensure that health
care providers met acceptable standards. Id.
150. Id. at 44-47.
15 1. Id. at 43-44.
152. Id. at 39-40.
153. Id. at 46. See also Kussorow, Handley & Yessian, An Overview of State Medical Disci-
pline, 257 J. A.M.A. 820, 823 (1987) (arguing that the clear and convincing evidentiary standard
for physician discipline is an impediment to regulation of physician competency).
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4. Redistribution of Insurance Costs
The fourth major Task Force proposal is a plan providing liability
insurance premium assistance to selected physicians. Entitled the Pre-
mium Impact Equity Plan, 5 4 this scheme would provide a subsidy to
physicians who demonstrate substantial financial hardship due to lia-
bility insurance costs.' 55 Physicians would be eligible for the proposed
subsidy if their incomes fell below a predetermined figure and if they
paid more than a specified percentage of their gross medical practice
revenues on liability insurance. 156 Eligibility for premium subsidization
also would be dependent on the physician meeting specified perform-
ance standards such as an absence of prior medical malpractice paid
claims or disciplinary actions. 5 7
The proposal recommends that a state agency, financed by a sur-
charge on medical malpractice premiums, administer the premium
subsidies.' The amount of the premium subsidy to eligible physicians
would be the amount necessary to bring the percentage of gross reven-
ues spent on liability premiums down to specified levels.5 9 The Task
Force's stated goal in recommending the Premium Impact Equity
Plan is to promote health care availability by providing assistance to
physicians who might otherwise be unable to establish a medical prac-
tice in the state, such as the young practitioner in a high-risk specialty
practicing in a medically underserved area. 6°
5. Negative Recommendations
In addition to the proposals outlined above, the Task Force consid-
ered and recommended against legislative adoption of several reforms.
Specifically, the Task Force recommended against adoption of re-
forms that limit a plaintiff's right to recover damages while requiring
the plaintiff to prove fault. Included in this category are the Medical
Incident Compensation Act and a constitutional amendment limiting
noneconomic damages in all cases. 161 The Task Force reasoned that
154. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 50-56.
155. Id.at 51.
156. Id.
157. Id. The Task Force did not recommend values for the income figure or the figure for
excessive proportionate cost of liability insurance. Id.
158. Id. at 53.
159. Id. at 52.
160. Id. at 13-14. Examples include obstetrics, orthopedics, and neurosurgery.
161. Id. at 34-35. The Medical Incident Compensation Act (MICA) would have limited a
plaintiff's economic damages and totally eliminated noneconomic damages. The proposed con-
stitutional amendment would have limited recovery of noneconomic damages in all tort cases to
$100,000. Id. This proposed amendment appeared as Amendment 10 on the November 1988
ballot and was rejected by the voters. See Anderson, Yes to English, No to Amendment 10,
Miami Herald, Nov. 9, 1988, at IA, col. 3.
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such proposals limit the rights of injured plaintiffs without distin-
guishing meritorious from nonmeritorious claims. 162 Additionally,
these proposals do nothing to reduce the transaction costs of the civil
justice system.
The final negative recommendations are in the area of liability in-
surance reform. First, the Task Force rejected the suggestion that phy-
sician's liability insurance premiums be subsidized by general tax
revenues. 63 Second, it rejected proposals providing liability premium
relief to physicians in high-risk specialties by increasing the cost of
liability insurance to physicians in low-risk specialties. The Task Force
concluded that such schemes, called risk class compression plans, cre-
ate excessive governmental intrusion into the private insurance mar-
ket. In addition, risk compression plans have the potential to create
the anomaly of high-risk, high-income physicians being subsidized by
low-risk, lower-income, physicians. 64
III. REACHING A LEGISLATIVE CONSENSUS
Although the 1986 Legislature initiated a thorough review of the
tort system, rising rates and threatened withdrawal of medical mal-
practice insurers from the state provided the impetus for further legis-
lative action. However, the two houses of the Legislature were at odds
as to the primary cause of the crisis, and therefore, as to the ways of
resolving the problems, even on a temporary basis.
Following the lead of Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter, the
House in the 1987 Regular Session looked to insurance industry pric-
ing standards as a means of providing relief to physicians who pay the
larger malpractice premiums.' 65 Generally known as the "mandatory
pooling plan," the House proposal recommended that the majority of
low-risk physicians who pay substantially lower premiums partially
subsidize the premiums paid by the minority of physicians who prac-
tice in high-risk specialties. 166 This would be accomplished by requir-
ing all insured physicians to purchase primary coverage from a state
insurance fund and by establishing a maximum differential in pre-
miums. The House proposal would have permitted the highest rate to
162. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 35.
163. Id. at 50. "
164. Id. at 50-51.
165. Fla. CS for HB 1458, § 2 (1987) (First Engrossed). The legislation also provided for a
lower standard of care in emergency room situations. Id. § 3.
166. Id. § 2. The House Insurance Committee predicted that high-risk specialists would re-
ceive a rate reduction of 25% to 4007o. Premiums of low-risk physicians were expected to remain
at the then-present levels, but could rise slighty. Staff of Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins., CS for HB
1458 (1987) Staff Anaysis 3 (final July 21, 1987) (on file with committee).
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be no greater than five times the lowest rate,167 rather than the tenfold
differential currently encountered by neurosurgeons and similar spe-
cialists.' 68 The cost of subsidization would be offset to some degree by
savings resulting from having the insurance system operated by the
state on a nonprofit basis. 69
The Senate in 1987 did not adopt a formal position, although gener-
ally it was accepted that a 1985 bill supported by the Florida Medical
Association, commonly known by the acronym "MICA" (Medical In-
cident Compensation Act), 70 had substantial support in the upper
chamber.' 7' This proposal would compensate individuals injured by
medical malpractice on a scheduled basis similar to that employed un-
der workers' compensation statutes. 72 Although initially touted as a
no-fault proposal, MICA would require at least a substantial showing
that the injury resulted from actual malpractice, arguably requiring
the same level of proof required under general tort law. 7 1
As the close of the 1987 Regular Session approached, it was clear
that a compromise would not be reached. The likelihood of calling a
special session to address the medical malpractice problems became
immediately apparent. Accordingly, concurrent with the study of the
Task Force, two groups were appointed in Tallahassee to prepare for
the special session on medical malpractice. The Speaker of the House
appointed an ad hoc House committee chaired by Representative Carl
Ogden, 74 the Chairman of the Committee on Insurance. Representa-
tive Hamilton Upchurch,175 the Chairman of the Committee on Judici-
167. Fla. CS for HB 1458, § 2 at 9, lines 12-18 (1987) (First Engrossed) (proposed amend-
ment to FLA. STAT. § 627.351(4)(d) (Supp. 1986)).
168. See TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 27. In 1987, rates for family
physicians and neurological surgeons in Dade and Broward Counties for medical malpractice
insurance coverage of $1 million per claim/$3 million annual aggregate were $19,415 and
$192,420, respectively.
169. The proposed bill would prohibit the paying of sales commissions and exempt the pre-
miums from application of premium taxes. See Fla. CS for HB 1458, § 2 at 10, line 20 and at 13,
lines 1-3 (1987) (First Engrossed).
170. Fla. SB 1030 (1985).
171. This perception, however, may have been erroneous. Senator John Vogt, Dem., Cocoa
Beach, 1972-1988, cosponsor of the 1985 MICA bill, and Senate President during the 1987 Regu-
lar Session, indicated that he would not support the MICA proposal unless it was the only solu-
tion the Legislature could achieve. Huard, Vogt: Doctors May Strike to Force Legislative
Action, Palm Beach Post, Aug. 29, 1987, at 10A, col. 2.
172. See Fla. CS for HB 1458, § 2 (1987) (First Engrossed).
173. Id. § 1, at 2, lines 18-24. "In any action . . . the claimant shall have the burden of
proving by the greater weight of the evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider
represented a breach of the accepted standard of care for that health care provider." Id.
174. Dem., Jacksonville, 1968-1987.
175. Dem., St. Augustine, 1978-1988.
19881
562 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW [Vol. 16:535
ary, served as Vice-Chairman. 7 6 At the same time, a joint legislative/
executive committee, commonly known as the Governor's Working
Group, was created and charged with finding a consensus position on
medical malpractice reforms for submission to the Legislature at the
special session. It consisted of four members of the House, four mem-
bers of the Senate, and four people representing the Governor and
was chaired jointly by Representative Ogden and Senator Dempsey
Barron. 77 The failure to agree on the appointment of a single chair-
man is indicative of the wide divergence of opinion on the scope of
and solutions to problems with medical malpractice insurance and the
tort system.
Although the House previously endorsed legislation that created the
medical malpractice insurance pool, 78 strong opposition from the in-
surance industry and the Florida Medical Association eroded enthusi-
asm for the proposal among the members of the House. Accordingly,
when the ad hoc House committee considered the various proposals,
at least ten plans were presented to it.179 Formal consideration of all of
the proposals did not occur, however, since the absence of some Dem-
ocratic members and a boycott by some Republican members pre-
vented the convening of a quorum. Nevertheless, a review of several
of the major proposals submitted by members and various interest
groups before the Task Force released its recommendations provides
significant insight into the options available to the Legislature.
A. The Early Legislative Proposals
Along the lines of prior Senate proposals, two substantially differ-
ent versions of a workers' compensation-type system of compensating
176. Other committee members are Representatives Mike Abrams, Dem., Miami (Chairman,
Committee on Health Care); Sam Bell, Dem., Ormond Beach, 1974-1988 (Chairman, Committee
on Appropriations); Jim Burke, Dem., Miami (Speaker Pro Tempore); Carl Carpenter, Dem.,
Plant City (Chairman, Committee on Rules); Peter Dunbar, Repub., Crystal Beach, 1978-1988
(Chairman, Minority Policy Committee); Bud Gardner, Dem., Titusville, 1978-1988 (Chairman,
Committee on Finance & Taxation); Elaine Gordon, Dem., North Miami; Tom Gustafson,
Dem., Ft. Lauderdale (Speaker-Designate); Mary Ellen Hawkins, Repub., Naples; Fred Lipp-
man, Dem., Hollywood (Chairman, Committee on Regulatory Reform); Dale Patchett, Repub.,
Vero Beach (Minority Leader); John Renke, Repub., New Port Richie (Minority Floor Whip);
Art Simon, Dem., Miami; and Dave Thomas, Repub., Englewood.
177. The Governor's Working Group consisted of Cochairmen Senator Dempsey Barron,
Dem., Panama City, 1960-1988, and Representative Ogden; Senators Mattox Hair, Dem., Jack-
sonville, 1974-1988; Toni Jennings, Repub., Orlando; Curt Kiser, Repub., Palm Harbor; and
Representatives Burke, Carpenter, and Patchett; and Gregory Coler (Secretary, Department of
Health); Amy Baker (Director of Legislative Affairs); Bill Bryant (Special Counsel to the Gover-
nor); and Larry Polivka (Policy Coordinator for Health and Human Services).
178. Fla. CS for HB 1458 (1987).
179. The various proposals are on file with the House Insurance Committee.
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medical injuries were submitted. A plan authored by Representative
Ron Glickman' 80 recommended a strictly no-fault program which
would provide an administrative hearing to allow a person to recover
for any injury arising from the provision or failure to provide medical
care.' 8 ' Although the plan would allow recovery for noneconomic
damages, total recovery would be capped at $450,000 unless the plain-
tiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that a greater amount is
warranted. 18 2 In contrast, the Florida Medical Association recom-
mended a fault-based system which would compensate only injuries
arising from malpractice, and would limit damages on a scheduled ba-
sis similar to that provided for in workers' compensation injuries."3 A
form of noneconomic damages would be awardable under this plan
but the maximum amount would be $100,000. The Florida Medical
Association's plan was substantially similar to the MICA plan sup-
ported by Senator Barron during the 1985 Regular Session.'8
Representative Glickman proposed a second alternative which
would cap physician liability at $500,000 per occurrence, with excess
judgments recoverable against a state-funded plan.'85 However, Rep-
resentative Art Simon, 8 6 one of the major forces behind the 1985
Medical Malpractice Act and the 1986 Insurance and Tort Reform
Act, submitted a less costly program. Under Representative Simon's
plan, noneconomic damages would be capped at $250,000, and total
damages would be capped at $1,000,000.187 Excess judgments would
be recoverable from the Legislature by a special act if the plaintiff
established entitlement to compensation in excess of the proposed lim-
its."' Additionally, the proposal would create a state-funded subsidy
of medical malpractice premiums for amounts in excess of ten percent
of gross medical practice revenues, 89 and it would require hospitals to
indemnify physicians for suits arising from emergency care provided
180. Dem., Tampa.
181. H.R. Preliminary Draft 97-37-8-7, § 6, at 11, lines 8-11 (1987) (on file with Fla. H.R.
Comm. on Ins.).
182. Id. § 7, at 11-12.
183. Florida Medical Association Draft 3-563A-85 (Draft 1), § 2, at 11 (Aug. 12, 1987) (on
file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins.). The bill would require the plaintiff to establish a "breach of
the prevailing professional standard of care." Id. § 1, at 2, lines 5-9.
184. See Fla. SB 1030 (1985).
185. H.R. Preliminary Draft 97-40A-9-7 (1987) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins.).
186. Dem., Miami.
187. H.R. Preliminary Draft 242-157-8-7 (Sept. 9, 1987) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on
Ins.).
188. Id. § 2, at 7, lines 12-22. Representative Simon also proposed a constitutional amend-
ment authorizing these limitations. See Proposed Fla. HJR (Sept. 10, 1987) (unnumbered) (pro-
posing the creation of FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 24) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins.).
189. Id. § 1, at 2-3.
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to trauma patients. 190 A third proposal, presented by Representative
Ron Silver,' 9' the House Majority Leader, recommended a cap of
$1,000,000 for damage awards against physicians or hospitals who
participate in the Premium Assurance Plan.192 Representative Silver's
plan would eliminate punitive damage awards in medical malpractice
actions' 93 and would provide premium subsidies to hospitals that ac-
tively provide indigent and Medicaid treatment, and to physicians who
actively provide Medicaid treatment. 94
Representative Ogden and Insurance Commissioner Gunter sug-
gested creating a mandated state-sponsored insurance program with a
limitation on premium differentials similar to the 1987 House legisla-
tion. 95 This legislation was intended to expire within three years, be-
cause by that time it was assumed that the 1985 and 1986 reforms
would have stabilized the private insurance market. 96 However, the
mandatory state insurance program was rejected by the Task Force in
its final recommendations on medical malpractice. 197
An ad hoc committee composed of nine physicians and nine attor-
neys practicing in Palm Beach County presented one of the most in-
teresting proposals. 198 This proposal, commonly referred to as the
Palm Beach Plan, recommended creation of a state-run insurer in
which participation of all physicians would be mandated. 199 Unlike the
other proposals for mandatory state-run insurance plans, premiums
for the first $250,000 of coverage would not be subject to any limita-
tion under this plan, other than actuarial soundness .20 Excess cover-
age for indemnities between $250,000 and $2,000,000 would be paid
equally by all physicians with an estimated cost of $3,500 per physi-
cian. 20 1 The Palm Beach Plan also would reduce judgments by the
190. Id. § 13, at 19.
191. Dem., North Miami Beach.
192. H.R. Preliminary Draft 117-180-8-7, § 1, at 1-2 (1987) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm.
on Ins.).
193. Id.
194. Id. § 3, at 5.
195. Preliminary Draft by Rep. Ogden, § 1, at 5 (Sept. 9, 1987) (on file with Fla. H.R.
Comm. on Ins.); Preliminary Draft by Dep't. of Ins., § 2, at 8 (Sept. 1, 1987) (on file with Fla.
H.R. Comm. on Ins.).
196. Preliminary Draft by Dep't. of Ins., § 2, at 10 (Sept. 1, 1987) (on file with H.R. Comm.
on Ins.).
197. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 3.
198. See letter and accompanying proposal (Palm Beach Plan) froni Theodore Babbitt, at-
torney and member of the ad hoc committee, to Rep. Carl Ogden (Aug. 14, 1987) (on file with
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins.) thereinafter Palm Beach Plan].




amount of any payments received from collateral sources, such as
workers' compensation, health insurance, or automobile liability in-
surance, and would eliminate the right of such insurers to subrogation
of medical malpractice recoveries. 202
The provisions for which the Palm Beach Plan became most known
are the variations on provisions included in the 1985 Medical Malprac-
tice Act. 20 3 While the 1985 Act required pre-suit investigations by both
plaintiffs and defendants and encouraged the parties to obtain expert
medical opinions,204 the Palm Beach Plan would go further. For ex-
ample, under this plan it would be prima facie evidence of bad faith
litigation when the plaintiff failed to obtain the required written ex-
pert opinion before notifying each defendant of the intention to initi-
ate litigation, or when the defendant did not receive a corresponding
written expert opinion prior to denying the claim. 20 5 The Palm Beach
Plan would give the court the authority to dismiss a claim or strike a
defense if it is found that the action or answer was filed without good
cause," and it would expand the arbitration provisions of the 1985
Act which permitted the defendant to offer to arbitrate upon an ad-
mission of liability. 20 7 Under the 1985 provisions, if the defendant ad-
mits liability, the defendant may opt for binding arbitration and the
plaintiff would be required to arbitrate rather than litigate. 20 8 Al-
though not enacted, the Palm Beach Plan served as the basis for some
of the recommendations of the Task Force.
With the collapse of the House ad hoc committee, the burden of
finding a starting point for the Legislature rested primarily with the
Governor's Working Group and the Task Force. The Task Force is-
sued its recommendations to the Governor's Working Group and af-
ter much deliberation they were accepted as the starting point for the
Legislature. 20 9 The task of refining and implementing the recommen-
dations was left to the Legislature.
202. Id. at 2.
203. These include recommendations on pre-suit screening and arbitration. Of particular in-
terest is the recommendation that both the plaintiff and defendant obtain written medical opin-
ions and the proposed two-tiered arbitration proceeding in which the plaintiff participates in
establishing the amount of damages, but the allocation of responsibility is arbitrated only among
the defendants. See id. at 2-4.
204. See FLA. STAT. § 768.57 (1987).
205. Palm Beach Plan, supra note 198, at 2.
206. Id. at 3.
207. Id.
208. FLA. STAT. § 768.57(3)(b)(3) (1985).
209. See letter from Sen. Barron and Rep. Ogden, Cochairmen of the Governor's Working
Group, to Gov. Bob Martinez, Rep. Jon Mills and Sen. John Vogt (Jan. 14, 1988) (on file with
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins.).
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B. Refining the Task Force Proposals in the Special Session
The effort to implement the recommendations of the Task Force in
the House was spearheaded by Representative Sam Bell, °10 who wrote
the legislation that established the Task Force in 1986.211 Although sig-
nificant variations were included, the Task Force's recommendations
served as an outline for Representative Bell's proposal in the 1988
Special Session of the Legislature. For example, Representative Bell's
proposal suggested subsidies only to physicians practicing in medical
manpower shortage areas in lieu of a statewide premium equity
plan. 212 The bill also addressed the issue of emergency care by redefin-
ing the standard of care to which a patient is entitled when receiving
trauma care or emergency care. 21 3 The concept to assure plaintiffs full
recovery of all damages in arbitration also was altered by Representa-
tive Bell's proposal. Under this variation, where only some defendants
agree to arbitrate, the arbitrators selected by the defendants would al-
locate damages among all defendants, including those not in arbitra-
tion, and the arbitrating defendants would be responsible only for
payment of their pro rata share. 214
Although the proposed legislation was discussed at several hearings
prior to the special session, 2 5 the task of either amending or rejecting
the legislation was left for the committee meetings and floor debate
scheduled for the special session. The Senate proposal 21 6 was referred
to only one substantive committee, 217 whereas the House proposal28
was referred to the Insurance and Judiciary Committees and ulti-
mately to the Appropriations Committee, which is chaired by the pro-
posal's principal sponsor, Representative Bell. 21 9 Concurrently, the
House Regulatory Reform Committee considered the portion of the
210. Dem., Ormond Beach, 1974-1988.
211. Representative Bell sponsored the original legislation creating the Task Force. See Fla.
HB 565 (1986). The language passed as part of the 1986 Tort Reform and Insurance Act. Ch. 86-
160, § 63, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 756.
212. Fla. HB 7-E, § 1, at 28-34 (1988).
213. Id. § 1, at 52-57.
214. Id. § 1, at 25. But see id. at 22 (providing that all defendants are jointly and severally
liable for all of the plaintiff's damages).
215. The House Committee on Insurance considered drafts of the legislation on January 6,
1988, and January 21, 1988. The House Committee on Judiciary considered drafts in workshop
on January 28, 1988 (drafts on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins. and Fla. H.R. Comm. on
Judiciary).
216. Fla. SB 6-E (1988).
217. FLA. S. JoUR. 4 (Spec. Sess. Feb. 2, 1988). The bill also was referred to the Senate
Appropriations Committee. Id.
218. Fla. HB 7-E (1988).
219. FLA. H.R. JouR. 5 (Spec. Sess. Feb. 2, 1988).
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
legislation that addressed the regulation of health care profession-
als. 220
Many of the concerns of the Insurance Committee had been ad-
dressed previously. Nevertheless, the committee members submitted
nearly 150 proposed amendments, approximately 100 of which were
sponsored by Representative Simon. 221 The Insurance Committee,
however, did not adopt any major policy changes. The bill was re-
ported to the Judiciary Committee222 where Representative Simon,
who was also a member of the Judiciary Committee, reoffered several
amendments which had been either defeated or were not considered
by the Insurance Committee. 223
The legislation which left the Judiciary Committee differed substan-
tially from that recommended by the Task Force, Representative Bell,
and the Insurance Committee. 224 Few provisions remained unchanged.
A proposal supported by trial lawyers which provided mandatory
nonbinding arbitration of all medical malpractice cases without dam-
age limitations replaced the voluntary binding arbitration provision
that limited damages. 225 The premium assistance plan no longer ap-
plied to areas of medical manpower shortage, but rather provided a
subsidy to each physician who paid in excess of ten percent of gross
income for medical malpractice insurance. 226 A higher burden of
proof of the prevailing professional standard of care and a good faith
defense replaced the gross negligence standard of care for emergency
treatment delivered at a trauma center,2 27 proposed by Representative
Bell. 22 The bill requested the Supreme Court of Florida to adopt new
standard jury instructions to address the exigencies of emergency
treatment. 2 9 The bill required obstetricians to participate in the Flor-
ida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association.230
Additional funding would be raised by assessing abortion clinics $50
per abortion 23' in addition to the hospital assessment of $50 per
220. Id. at 6. Fla. HB I l-E (1988) (this bill contains the same regulatory provisions as Fla.
HB 7-E (1988)).
221. Proposed amendments on file with the House Committee on Insurance.
222. FLA. LEGIS., HISTORY OF LEGISLATION, 1988 SPECIAL SESSION E, HISTORY OF HOUSE BILLS
at 797, HB 7-E.
223. Proposed amendments on file with the House Committee on Judiciary.
224. See Fla. CS for HB 7-E (1988).
225. Id. § 1, at 19-20.
226. Id. at 26-32.
227. Id. at 51-53.
228. See supra notes 210-14 and accompanying text.
229. Id. § 51, at 128-29.
230. Id. § 1, at 44.
231. Id. at 45.
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birth,232 and by increasing the contribution of obstetricians from
$5,000 to $30,000 over a period of five years. 233 Amendments also
were approved to prohibit coercion of hospital employees relating to
testimony in malpractice cases, 234 and extending the statute of limita-
tions an additional year for the purpose of adding defendants. 35 Es-
sentially, only the pre-suit screening and regulation of the medical
professions remained intact.
The bill was reported out of the Judiciary Committee as Committee
Substitute for House Bill 7. The amendments were incorporated over-
night and the Appropriations Committee heard the bill the following
morning. With the exception of the coercion amendment, the Appro-
priations Committee reversed the Judiciary Committee amendments
and returned the legislation essentially to the version adopted by the
Insurance Committee. 236 The standard of care issue, however, was
readdressed on the floor of the House, where the "reckless disregard"
standard for emergency care again was rejected in favor of a require-
ment of proving by clear and convincing evidence the breach of the
prevailing professional standard of care, coupled with a good faith
defense. Unlike the amendment adopted by the Judiciary Committee,
the standard applied to all emergency care delivered in hospitals or
trauma centers.
237
While the House legislation underwent substantial review and revi-
sion, the Senate legislation 238 was referred only to the sponsoring
Commerce Committee and the Appropriations Committee.139 The
Senate legislation, as proposed by the Commerce Committee and ap-
proved by the Appropriations Committee, was comparatively limited
in that it did not include any provisions relating to the birth-related
neurological injury plan or the premium subsidies for physicians. 240
Consistent with the House legislation, the bill addressed the regulation
of the medical profession and pre-suit screening of claims by both
plaintiffs and defendants. 24' Also it provided additional limited immu-
nity for emergency rooms or trauma centers, although at a different
232. Id. at 44.
233. Id. at 45.
234. Id. § 5, at 63.
235. Id. § 50, at 128.
236. See FLA. H.R. JOUR. 12-24 (Spec. Sess. Feb. 3, 1988) (amendments to Fla. CS for HB 7-
E (1988), sponsored by the Comm. on Approp.).
237. See id. at 22.
238. Fla. SB 6-E (1988).
239. FLA. S. JourR. 4 (Spec. Sess. Feb. 2, 1988).
240. See Fla. CS for SB 6-E (1988).
241. Id. The provisions were similar in scope and philosophy, but the language varied.
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standard than that provided in the House legislation. 242 Rather than
voluntary binding arbitration, the bill called for mandatory nonbind-
ing arbitration of all medical malpractice claims with sanctions for un-
reasonable requests for a trial de novo.23 Finally, the bill limited
noneconomic damages in all medical malpractice claims to $250,000,
absent clear and convincing evidence that an award above the cap is
not excessive. 2"
The victory of the trial lawyers in convincing the Senate committees
to approve nonbinding rather than binding arbitration was shortlived.
The full Senate adopted the proposal of the Task Force recommend-
ing voluntary binding arbitration with contingent caps on noneco-
nomic damages. 245 The Senate also removed the automatic across-the-
board cap on noneconomic damages, 24 a provision which had been
opposed at least as vehemently by the trial lawyers as the Task Force
arbitration plan.
When the bills were sent to conference, the two chambers agreed in
only two areas: the prompt resolution of meritorious claims (pre-suit
screening and arbitration) and enhanced regulation of the health care
industry. The House and Senate agreed to change the standard of care
in emergency rooms, but did not agree on the applicable standard.
The House had approved a premium subsidy plan for certain medical
personnel and the no-fault compensation plan for birth-related neuro-
logical injuries; the Senate had rejected both of those proposals. The
special session was scheduled to end the following day and the confer-
ees did not meet until the next morning. The only decision that had
been made was that the Senate bill would be the vehicle for amend-
ment because the Senate version passed before the House version.
Following short preliminary discussions, the Senate conferees
agreed to accept a no-fault compensation plan for birth-related inju-
ries if the House conferees agreed to drop the premium subsidy pro-
posals. 247 Additionally, the conferees committed themselves to seek a
compromise position on the standard of care in emergency room
242. Id. § 42, at 70. The standard of "reckless, but not conscious disregard" was amended
on the Senate floor to read "conscious disregard, or reckless disregard, whether conscious or
not." Id. § 42, at 70 (First Engrossed). The final House position required that the breach of the
prevailing professional standard of care be proven by clear and convincing evidence and included
a "good faith" defense for the health care provider. Fla. CS for HB 7-E, § 1, at 57 (1988) (First
Engrossed).
243. Fla. CS for SB 6-E, § 44 (1988).
244. Id.§ 45.
245. See FLA. S. JOUR. 8-10 (Spec. Sess. Feb. 3, 1988).
246. Id.
247. Conference Comm. on Fla. CS for SB 6-E, tape recording of proceedings (Feb. 4, 1988)
(on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Commerce) [hereinafter Conference Comm. Tapes].
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situations. 248 The House language on arbitration and pre-suit screen-
ing was adopted, and the Senate language on professional regulation
was adopted. 249 Staff was directed to return with a working draft to be
used by the conferees at a later meeting at which further amendments
would be considered.250 Without having an opportunity to fully read
the revised document,'25 ' conference committee members agreed to rec-
ommend it as the final conference report with only three minor
amendments: two relating to the doctrine of joint and several liability
in cases involving teaching hospitals, and one requiring that all Flor-
ida licensed physicians, whether or not practicing in the state, pay the
physician assessment for the Florida Birth-Related Neurological In-
jury Compensation Plan.2 2 The three amendments were inserted and
the conference committee members returned to sign the report. The
committee adopted the proposed conference committee report unani-
mously. 253
One of the defeated amendments deleted a provision which pur-
ported to limit the liability of arbitrating physicians and hospitals to
the policy limits of their respective insurance coverages.254 Upon learn-
ing that the amendment failed and that the Assistant Executive Direc-
tor of the Task Force believed that the amendment was needed to
improve the likelihood of sustaining the constitutionality of the
prompt resolution of claims provisions, the Speaker of the House no-
tified the conferees that he did not intend to reconvene the House-
which would effectively kill the entire proposal. The conferees then
agreed to reconvene and adopt an amendment which clarified their
intention that the proposal would apply only to insurers and not to
the insured health care providers. 2  The final conference recommen-




251. Because of editing and printing delays, the document was not available before the com-
mittee reconvened.
252. Conference Comm. Tapes, supra note 247. The amendment relating to the physician
assessments provided an estimated additional funding source of $1.6 million. Id.
253. Id.
254. Whether the language was intended to apply to defendants or to their insurers is un-
clear.
255. See ch. 88-1, § 54(3), 1988 Fla. Laws 119, 169 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207(3)
(Supp. 1988)). "The liability of any insurer shall be subject to any applicable insurance policy
limits." Id.
256. The House adjourned after brief remarks, and the medical malpractice special session
came to a close. FLA. H.R. JouR. 65 (Spec. Sess. Feb. 4, 1988).
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IV. PROMPT RESOLUTION OF CLAIMS
The most controversial proposals submitted by the Task Force were
those relating to the prompt resolution of meritorious claims. Al-
though representing an extension of concepts adopted by the Legisla-
ture in 1985, the differences between the Task Force recommendations
and the 1985 legislation were viewed as among the most substantial
tort reform ever considered by the Florida Legislature. The reforms
were assailed by both the plaintiffs' bar and the defense bar as un-
workable; 217 criticized by physicians as being too lenient for plain-
tiffs; 2 8 and criticized by public interest groups as representing an
unwarranted deprivation of citizen rights.2Y9 Thus, they served as the
primary lightning rod for attacks on the Task Force's proposals.
The proposal for prompt resolution of meritorious claims can be
divided into two basic concepts.26° First, plaintiffs and defendants
must be prevented from filing unwarranted claims and defenses. 26'
Second, both parties should be encouraged to submit meritorious
claims to arbitration to avoid the emotional and financial costs of liti-
gation and the uncertainty of jury verdicts. 26 2 To accomplish these
goals, the Task Force recommended, and the Legislature adopted, a
revised version of the Palm Beach Plan. 263
As justification for the adoption of the prompt resolution propos-
als, the Legislature adopted various findings made by the Task
Force. 26 These included a determination that rapidly rising insurance
premiums are increasing the cost of medical care and threatening the
availability of quality medical care; that the primary cause of increas-
257. Representatives of the Trial Lawyers' Section of The Florida Bar, The Academy of
Florida Trial Lawyers, and The Florida Defense Lawyers' Association, questioned whether the
arbitration program would be used by any parties and suggested that the caps on damages would
violate the Florida Constitution. Fla. H.R., Comm. on Ins., tape recording of proceedings (Jan.
21, 1988) (tapes on file with Comm. on Ins.); Governor's Working Group, tape recording of
proceedings (Jan. 7, 1988) (tapes on file with H.R. Comm. on Ins.).
258. Although the concept was generally supported by physicians, the President of the Flor-
ida Medical Association suggested that the proposed cap on noneconomic damages was too high.
See Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems, transcript of confer-
ence proceedings 72-74 (Oct. 29, 1987) (testimony of Dr. James White, Pres., Fla. Med. Assoc.).
259. Governor's Working Group tape, supra note 257.
260. Ch. 88-1, § 48(2), 1988 Fla. Laws 119, 164 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.201(2) (Supp.
1988)).
261. Id. § 48(2)(a)(1), 1988 Fla. Laws at 164 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.201(2)(a)(1) (Supp.
1988)).
262. Id. § 42(2)(b)(1) (1988), 1988 Fla. Laws at 164 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.201(2)(b)(1)
(Supp. 1988)).
263. For a description of the Palm Beach Plan, see supra notes 198-208 and accompanying
text.
264. See ch. 88-1, § 48, 1988 Fla. Laws 119, 164 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.201 (Supp.
1988)).
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ing premiums is the increase in loss payments; that submission of
claims to arbitration reduces costs; and that full recovery of economic
losses, such as lost wages, represents an unnecessary windfall for
plaintiffs since damages are not subject to taxation. 265
To achieve the goal of early resolution of meritorious claims, legis-
lation was passed to both prevent frivolous litigation and to provide a
system of voluntary binding arbitration. 266 Unlike prior attempts to
discourage frivolous litigation, the 1988 provisions mandate investiga-
tion by all parties and provide a method of verifying the opposing
party's compliance. 267 Unlike previous attempts to encourage arbitra-
tion, the 1988 legislation provides specific financial incentives to both
parties in addition to the general incentives of decreasing delay and
litigation costs. 261
The starting point for the 1988 legislative attempt to discourage liti-
gation of frivolous suits and suits where liability is clear was the 1985
legislation which required a plaintiff to mail notice of intent to initiate
litigation to each defendant at least ninety days prior to filing a mal-
practice complaint.269 When adopted in 1985, the ninety-day period
was intended to provide the defendant or the insurance company an
opportunity to investigate the claim and, when appropriate, to seek an
amicable settlement prior to the filing of a suit.270 The statute encour-
aged, but did not require, the defense to obtain a medical opinion as
one of the methods of complying with the investigation requirement.
The 1985 Act did not require the plaintiff to conduct an investigation
prior to mailing the notice of intent to initiate litigation, recognizing
the plaintiff's relatively weak position in discovering the essential evi-
dence needed to pinpoint the tortious act or failure to act which re-
sulted in injury. 27I This is because the plaintiff is often not in a
265. Id.
266. Ch. 88-277, §§ 30-35, 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 766.207-
.209, .21, .211, .212 (Supp. 1988)).
267. Although the 1985 Medical Malpractice Act required an investigation by all parties, the
1988 provisions require each party to obtain a verified written medical expert opinion. Failure to
obtain such an opinion is readily verifiable. Compare ch. 88-277, § 26, 1988 Fla. Laws 1422,
1473 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.203 (Supp. 1988)) with FLA. STAT. §§ 768.495, .57 (1985).
268. Ch. 88-277, § 30, 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207 (Supp.
1988)).
269. FLA. STAT. § 768.57 (1985).
270. The defendant could avoid the filing of a claim in the judicial system by admitting
liability and offering to arbitrate damages if the plaintiff would agree to a limitation on non-
economic damages. Although the amount of the damage limitation was not provided, the defen-
dant was permitted to set a limit in the offer. See id. § 768.57(3)(bX3).
271. The statute required the plaintiff's counsel to conduct a reasonable investigation prior
to filing the action. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 768.495(l) (1985) (requiring the attorney filing the
action to make a "reasonable investigation as permitted by the circumstances").
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position to determine which parties should be held responsible for the
injury.
In addressing this issue, the Task Force determined that a need ex-
isted for investigation by both the plaintiff and the defendant, and
that the plaintiff's investigation should be completed before the notice
of intent to initiate litigation is mailed to the defendant. 272 However,
the Task Force did not recommend the methodology to be employed
by plaintiffs in conducting the investigation, although it did suggest
that a written medical opinion corroborating the claim should be re-
quired. 273 In speaking to the discovery problems, the Task Force
merely stated that "[t]his proposal would include procedures for al-
lowing both claimant and the defendant to have reasonable access to
information within the possession or control of the other party in or-
der to evaluate the claim. ' ' 274 The 1985 Act already required the plain-
tiff to submit to a physical examination and to provide the defendant
discoverable information without the requirement of formal discov-
ery. 275 Accordingly, the only issue left to be addressed was the extent
to which the plaintiff could pursue discovery.
It was clear that if a system could be devised which enables the
plaintiff to obtain the necessary evidence prior to mailing the notice of
intent to initiate litigation, the involvement of unnecessary defendants
in the litigation could be avoided. Likewise, with the information ob-
tained from the pre-suit investigation, settlement offers could be more
intelligently evaluated by the plaintiff. On the other hand, legislation
permitting discovery prior to filing a complaint may be unduly bur-
densome on defendants and thereby negate the objective of protecting
defendants from the costs of unwarranted claims. As a compromise
between protecting the right of the plaintiff to receive essential infor-
mation and protecting a potential unnamed defendant from burden-
some intrusion, the legislation permits discovery of all medical
records, but does not require defendants to submit to questioning in
the form of interrogatories or depositions or other forms of pretrial
discovery. 276 This limited discovery may be sufficient to permit a med-
ical expert to make an initial diagnosis as to the probable cause of an
272. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 16.
273. Id. at 19.
274. Id.
275. See FLA. STAT. § 768.57 (1985).
276. Ch. 88-277, § 27, 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1474 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.204 (Supp.
1988)). The plaintiff also is entitled to informal discovery following the mailing of the notice of
intent to intiate litigation. The additional discovery will assist the plaintiff in evaluating a defen-
dant's settlement offer or offer to arbitrate. See id. § 28, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1475 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 766.205 (Supp. 1988)).
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injury where the records are inconclusive. However, an argument may
be made that the requirement of obtaining a corroborating written
medical expert opinion deprives a plaintiff of the constitutional right
of access to the courts. 27
In conjunction with the requirement that the plaintiff obtain an ex-
pert opinion prior to mailing the notice of intent to initiate litiga-
tion, 27 8 the 1988 malpractice reforms also require a defendant to
obtain an opinion prior to denying the claim. The opinion obtained by
the defendant must corroborate the existence of "reasonable grounds
for lack of negligent injury sufficient to support the response denying
negligent injury. ' 279 This opinion may be based on either a finding
that the injury did not result from negligence or that the defendant
did not perform in a negligent manner and that the injury resulted
from the negligence of a party other than the defendant.
The 1988 Act also provides authority for the court either to dismiss
the claim or to strike a defense where the requirements of pre-suit in-
vestigation, including the obtaining of written corroboration by a
medical expert, have not been met. 280 Additionally, sanctions may be
imposed against the offending party, or the offending party's counsel,
whichever is appropriate. 281 The sanctions include both attorney's fees
and costs incurred during the pre-suit investigation. 2 2 The legislation
provides for such relief to be granted in response to a motion filed
subsequent to the completion of the pre-suit investigation. 28 1 But,
since neither the claim nor the defense would be before the court, it is
likely that the court would not entertain such motions prior to the
filing of the complaint or the response.
Where the court finds that an attorney failed to conduct a proper
pre-suit investigation, the court is directed to report the attorney to
277. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21. The law merely requires, however, that the opinion state that
there are "reasonable grounds to support the claim of medical negligence." Ch. 88-277, § 26,
1988 Fla. Laws at 1473 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.203 (Supp. 1988)). Where the records are
inconclusive, a medical expert could, in good faith, determine that "reasonable" grounds exist.
Additional discovery is provided to both the plaintiff and the defendant after the notice of intent
to initiate litigation is mailed. Id. § 28, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1475 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.205
(Supp. 1988)). The statute of limitation is tolled for 90 days following the mailing of the notice
of intent to initiate litigation. FLA. STAT. § 768.57(4) (1987).
278. Ch. 88-277, § 26, 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1473 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.203 (Supp.
1988)).
279. Id.
280. Id. § 29, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1475 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.206 (Supp. 1988)).
281. Id. § 29(2)-(3), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1475 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.206(2)-(3) (Supp.
1988)).
282. Id.
283. Id. § 29(1), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1475 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.206(1) (Supp. 1988)).
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The Florida Bar for disciplinary review. 84 To discourage medical ex-
perts from expressing unsupported opinions, the courts are directed to
report any medical expert who issues an opinion not supported by rea-
sonable investigation. Such reports are to be made to the Division of
Medical Quality Assurance or a similar regulatory agency in the state
in which the expert is admitted to practice.285 If an expert is disquali-
fied by a court at least three times for issuing an unsupported opinion,
any court may refuse to consider future expert testimony provided by
that expert.286
As the Legislature approached the special session on medical mal-
practice, support existed for the development of an arbitration alter-
native tailored to medical malpractice claims. Prior to the 1988
Special Session, three separate mechanisms for arbitration of a medi-
cal malpractice claim were available: 287 (1) The court could require
both parties to submit to nonbinding arbitration of the entire claim;288
or (2) the parties could agree to binding arbitration of the entire
claim;2 9 or (3) if the defendant was willing to admit liability, the de-
fendant could offer voluntary binding arbitration limited to the issue
of damages. 290 Despite the existence of these provisions, the Legisla-
ture entertained new proposals for the arbitration of medical malprac-
tice cases.
The Trial Attorneys' Section of the Florida Bar recommended a
specific arbitration system for medical malpractice cases. 29' The pro-
posal is modeled after a mandatory nonbinding arbitration plan used
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
In many respects this plan is similar to the provisions of section
44.303, Florida Statutes, except that the court is required to refer a
medical malpractice case to nonbinding arbitration, and the imposi-
tion of sanctions for requesting a trial de novo are more limited.2 92 In
contrast to the Bar proposal, the Palm Beach Plan suggested manda-
284. Id. § 29(4), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.206(4) (Supp. 1988)).
285. Id. § 29(5), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.206(5) (Supp. 1988)).
286. Id.
287. See FLA. STAT. §§ 44.303-.304, 768.57, .575 (1987).
288. Id. §§ 44.303, 768.575.
289. Id. § 44.304.
290. Id. § 768.57.
291. See Governor's Working Group, tape recording of proceedings (Jan. 14, 1988) (tapes
on file with H.R. Comm. on Ins.).
292. Under the Florida Bar Proposal, the plaintiff requesting a trial de novo would have to
obtain a judgment of only 75% of the arbitration award to avoid sanctions. However, the defen-
dant requesting a trial de novo would have to avoid a judgment in excess of 125% of the arbitra-
tion award to avoid sanctions. Under section 44.303(5), Florida Statutes (1987), sanctions are
assessed if the party requesting a trial de novo does not obtain a more favorable result than the
arbitration decision.
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tory binding arbitration where the defendant agrees to pay all dam-
ages without regard to fault. 293
The Task Force, however, recommended a voluntary binding arbi-
tration provision that is voluntary for all parties. 294 As in the Palm
Beach Plan, a defendant wishing to arbitrate would be required to
waive any defenses (although the Task Force recommendation, unlike
the Palm Beach Plan, does not require an admission of guilt). Thus,
the arbitration is limited to the issue of damages. In other respects,
however, the Task Force recommendation is significantly different
from both the Palm Beach Plan and the 1985 Act.
The basic premise behind the arbitration plan submitted by the
Task Force is that parties will agree to arbitrate only if sufficient in-
centives exist to waive a jury trial on liability and damages. While the
medical malpractice binding arbitration provisions adopted by the
Legislature in 1985 offered the plaintiff the incentive to arbitrate in
order to avoid having to prove liability, the only clear incentive of-
fered to the defendant was to save trial costs and to avoid the uncer-
tainty of a jury verdict. The defendant could condition the offer to
arbitrate and admit liability on an agreement by the plaintiff to limit
recovery for noneconomic damages; 295 but if accepted by the plaintiff,
it is unlikely that the arbitration award would compensate the plaintiff
for economic losses after the legal fees are paid. 296 Where liability is
clear, the incentive to the plaintiff would be of little value. 297 Like-
wise, where liability is unclear, the defendant's incentives would be
diminished. 29 The Task Force, therefore, sought to include incentives
which apply to a wider range of cases and which are economically
more compelling for all parties.
The Task Force recommendation adopted by the Legislature pro-
vides a package of incentives and disincentives for both plaintiffs and
defendants. 299 Like the 1985 Act, plaintiffs are offered the incentive of
293. For a detailed account of the Palm Beach Plan, see supra notes 198-208 and accompa-
nying text.
294. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 21.
295. FLA. STAT. § 768.57(3)(b)(3) (1987).
296. While noneconomic damages are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for pain and suf-
fering, loss of companionship, and similar losses, generally it is recognized that plaintiff's coun-
sel is paid from noneconomic damages.
297. If the plaintiff fails to negotiate a favorable settlement in such cases, the jury still may
award noneconomic damages in an amount equal to what would have been awarded in arbitra-
tion.
298. Any savings in litigation costs must be weighed against the probability that a settlement,
discounting actual damages, can be achieved.
299. Ch. 88-277, §§ 30, 32, 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1476, 1479 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§
766.207, .209 (Supp. 1988)).
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recovering damages without having to prove liability.3°° Additionally,
a plaintiff who agrees to arbitrate is entitled to recover attorney's fees
up to a maximum of fifteen percent of the total recovery,3 °0 which
under most contingency contracts is approximately one-half of the
plaintiff's fees.3 02 The plaintiff also is encouraged to offer arbitration
which was not permitted under the 1985 Act; 03 if the offer to arbitrate
is refused by the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to attorney's fees
equal to twenty five percent of the award at trial and prejudgment
interest.?° The major disincentive for a plaintiff to accept or offer
arbitration is the limitation on noneconomic damages of $250,000.315
The defendant also retains the incentive of reduced litigation costs
that the 1985 Act provided. More importantly, defendants are assured
that if they accept an offer to arbitrate, or a plaintiff accepts the de-
fendant's offer, noneconomic damages cannot exceed $250,000.106 If a
defendant's offer is refused, noneconomic damages at trial are capped
at $350,000.307 These damage caps were opposed by a representative of
the Palm Beach ad hoc committee.30 In permitting any party to initi-
ate an offer to arbitrate,3°9 the Task Force proposal varies from the
1985 Act's arbitration provisions and the Palm Beach Plan, both of
which limit that option to the defendant. 10 Procedurally, the plaintiff
and defendant may make the offer at any time within ninety days fol-
lowing, or in conjunction with, the mailing of the notice of intent to
initiate litigation. 31' If the offer is not accepted within thirty days, it is
considered rejected, except that the defendant may accept the offer at
any time prior to, or in conjunction with, the response to the notice of
intent,3"2 which is due within ninety days.31 3
300. See id. § 30, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207 (Supp. 1988)).
301. Id.
302. For maximum fee schedules in contingency fee contracts, see FLA. BAR RULES OF PROF.
CONDUCT 4-1.5(F).
303. See FLA. STAT. § 768.57 (1985). The offer to arbitrate may only be made in the defen-
dant's response to the notice of intent to initiate litigation. Id.
304. Ch. 88-277, § 32(3), 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1480 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.209(3)
(Supp. 1988)).
305. Id. § 30(7), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1477 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207(7) (Supp. 1988)).
306. Id.
307. Id. § 32(4), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1480 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.209(4) (Supp. 1988)).
308. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 5.
309. Ch. 88-277, § 30(2), 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207(2)
(Supp. 1988)).
310. See FLA. STAT. § 768.57(3) (1987); see also letter and accompanying proposal from
Theodore Babbitt, supra note 198.
311. Ch. 88-277, § 30(2), 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1476 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207(2)
(Supp. 1988)).
312. Id. § 30(3), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1477 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207(3) (Supp. 1988)).
313. FLA. STAT. § 768.57(3)(b) (1987).
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Under the arbitration procedures adopted in 1988, initial arbitration
of the total amount of damages is conducted by a panel of three arbi-
trators: one is a hearing officer assigned by the Division of Adminis-
trative Hearings; one is selected by the plaintiffs; and one is selected
by the defendants. 31 4 The state hearing officer is designated as the
chief arbitrator" 5 and as the person with the authority to determine
legal issues such as the admissibility of evidence.3 1 6 The evidence code
applicable to the Administrative Procedures Act 31 7 also is designated
as the applicable code in the arbitration proceedings.318 The defen-
dants are responsible for paying the two privately-selected arbitra-
tors, 19 either at an agreed amount or in accordance with a fee
schedule established by the appropriate circuit court.3 20
In cases involving multiple defendants, an arbitration panel estab-
lishes the amount of damages; then, a second arbitration panel (con-
sisting of the hearing officer and two arbitrators selected by the
defendants) assigns degrees of fault to each defendant. 32 Damages as-
sessed against any defendant not participating in arbitration may be
recovered by the participating defendants in an action for contribu-
tion.3 22 However, once the participating defendants pay the total
amount of the arbitration award, they may be subject to a contribu-
tion action brought by any defendant who did not participate in the
arbitration proceeding.3 23
The initial arbitration panel is responsible for determining if the
plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages, and if so, in what
amount.3 24 Net economic damages must be awarded including past
and future medical expenses, loss of earning capacity, and eighty per-
cent of lost wages, less collateral source payments such as unemploy-
314. Ch. 88-277, § 30(4), 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1477 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207(4)
(Supp. 1988)).
315. Id.
316. Id. § 30(7)(I), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1478 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207(7)(1) (Supp.
1988)).
317. FLA. STAT. § 120.58(1)(a) (1987).
318. Ch. 88-277, § 30(10), 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1478 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207(10)
(Supp. 1988)).
319. Id. § 30(7)(g), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1478 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207(7)(g) (Supp.
1988)).
320. Id. § 30(6), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1422 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207(6) (Supp. 1988)).
321. Id. § 31, 1988 Fla. Laws at 1478 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.208 (Supp. 1988)). If a
hospital is one of the defendants, a hospital risk manager must serve as one of the two arbitra-
tors appointed by the defendants. If the defendants cannot agree on the selection of arbitrators,
the Director of the Division of Administrative Hearings appoints them from lists submitted by
the defendants. Id.
322. Id. § 31(6), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1479 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.208(6) (Supp. 1988)).
323. Id. § 31(5), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1479 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.208(5) (Supp. 1988)).
324. Id. § 30(7), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1477 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207(7) (Supp. 1988)).
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ment compensation and insurance recoveries for which no right of
subrogation exists.312 Noneconomic damages, on the other hand, are
strictly limited326 by a cap of $250,000 "calculated on a percentage
basis with respect to capacity to enjoy life. 32 7 Accordingly, where the
plaintiff suffers only a fifty percent loss of capacity, noneconomic
damages must be no greater than $125,000.28 The total amount of
noneconomic damages awarded to multiple claimants cannot exceed
$250,000.29 While not addressed in the legislation, presumably where
the total of noneconomic damages for multiple claimants exceeds
$250,000, the amount recoverable is prorated for each of the claim-
ants. For example, if two claimants each sustain $150,000 in noneco-
nomic damages, each would recover only $125,000 in noneconomic
damages. In keeping with the concept of not placing the issue of lia-
bility before the arbitration panel, the legislation prohibits an award
of punitive damages.330
The second arbitration panel is responsible for allocating among
various defendants the damages awarded by the first panel. This panel
may allocate a portion to a nonparticipating defendant,33" ' but as dis-
cussed below, such allocation will not affect the ability of the plaintiff
to recover the full amount of damages from the participating defen-
dants.
Once the Legislature selected the arbitration program recommended
by the Task Force, rather than that recommended by the trial attor-
neys, two major issues remained. First, the determination of the appli-
cation of the doctrine of joint and several liability was considered in
committee 3 2 Second, the extent to which a defendant may be held
liable for damages in excess of the applicable policy limits was not
resolved until the final moments of the 1988 Special Session.
As part of the 1986 Tort Reform Act, the Legislature modified the
application of the doctrine of joint and several liability by exempting
noneconomic damages from its scope.333 Although the attempt to
325. Id. § 30(7)(a), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1477 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207(7)(a) (Supp.
1988)).
326. Id. § 30(7), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1477 (codified at FLa. STAT. § 766.207(7) (Supp. 1988)).




330. Id. § 30(7)(d), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1477 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207(7)(d) (Supp.
1988)).
331. Id. § 31(4), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1479 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.208(4) (Supp. 1988)).
332. The application of the doctrine of joint and several liability was clarified in the House
by an amendment adopted in the Appropriations Committee.
333. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1987).
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abolish the doctrine failed in 1986, substantial support for its aboli-
tion remained. 334 Health care practitioners argued that as a further in-
centive for their participation in the arbitration alternative, the
doctrine should not apply in arbitration. Initially, Representative Bell,
the primary sponsor of the House legislation, adopted this position.335
However, the arbitration program adopted by the Legislature prohib-
its the plaintiff from participating in the allocation proceedings . 3
6
This raised the concern that defendants might shift the damage award
to either those defendants who are judgment-proof or to those not
participating in the arbitration process.337 This ability of the defen-
dants to limit their liability in a proceeding in which the plaintiff is
not allowed to participate raises substantial due process concerns.
Thus, a compromise approach was reached: apply the doctrine of
joint and several liability to the total arbitration award, including
noneconomic damages. 38 Applying the doctrine of joint and several
liability to noneconomic damages in arbitration proceedings is a re-
treat from the 1986 Tort Reform Act.3 9 However, to be fully under-
stood, it must be viewed in light of the fact that noneconomic
damages are limited in arbitration and the plaintiff is prohibited from
participating in the alloction proceedings. In this respect, both the
House and the Senate bills were philosophically in agreement.
A further attempt to limit the plaintiff's ability to recover in arbi-
tration arose from what initially seemed to be an innocuous provision
in the House proposal which was intended to apply to insurers.314 In
early drafts of Representative Bell's proposal, the term "defendant"
334. In the House, eight Democratic committee chairmen cosponsored legislation in 1988 to
completely abolish the doctrine of joint and several liability. See Fla. HB 591 (1988).
335. The bill sponsored by Representative Bell would have required each defendant to be
responsible for only a pro rata share of the damages awarded in arbitration. Fla. HB 7-E, § 1, at
25 (1988).
336. Plaintiffs do not participate in the allocation proceedings. See ch. 88-277, § 31, 1988
Fla. Laws 1422, 1478 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.208 (Supp. 1988)).
337. This is especially true since the nonarbitrating defendants lack standing to object to the
introduction of evidence relating to their contribution to the injury. Theoretically, the arbitra-
tion panel could allocate the total responsibility against the nonarbitrating defendants.
338. See ch. 88-277, § 31(4), 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1478 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.208(4)
(Supp. 1988)). Since the plaintiff is entitled to full recovery from the arbitrating defendants re-
gardless of the allocation decision, arguably the plaintiff is deprived of neither a property right
in the award nor of any right to redress by the prohibition of the opportunity to participate in
the allocation phase.
339. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81(5) (1987) (applying the doctrine of joint and several liability
only to economic damages except where the total damages do not exceed $25,000).
340. Fla. CS for HB 7-E, § 1, at 20, lines 20-28 (1988) (First Engrossed). "Such acceptance
[to arbitrate the dispute] . . . shall be a binding commitment to comply with the decision of the
arbitration panel, subject to any applicable insurance policy limits." Id. (emphasis added).
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was defined to include the defendant's insurer.341 Insurers were con-
cerned that agreeing to arbitrate might imply an agreement to pay
amounts in excess of coverage because the legislation limits the defen-
dant's liability to the amount of the policy limits. The bill also pro-
vides that the insurer cannot submit to arbitration without the consent
of the insured in recognition of the insured's liability for any excess
award.3 42 To clarify its intent, the House Insurance Committee
amended the limitation provision to apply specifically to insurers
rather than to defendants. 43 However, the House Judiciary Commit-
tee deleted the entire provision and rejected voluntary binding arbitra-
tion in favor of the mandatory nonbinding arbitration proposal
sponsored by the Bar.3" The binding arbitration provisions were rein-
serted by the House Appropriations Committee and the limitation was
inadvertantly reinserted with the term "defendant" rather than "in-
surer," which is the form in which it was adopted by the House.3 45
The error was not discovered until the House bill passed and the issue
was submitted to a joint conference committee.
Believing that the reinsertion of the term "defendant" was acciden-
tal, Representative Upchurch offered an amendment to the conference
committee which deleted the limitation. 46 This amendment was sup-
ported by staff of the Task Force which expressed the opinion that the
limitation was constitutionally suspect and would further discourage
the use of arbitration by plaintiffs.3 47 The Florida Medical Associa-
tion, however, strongly supported the limitation as a means of encour-
aging physicians to agree to arbitrate to protect personal assets. The
amendment offered by Representative Upchurch was defeated.3 48 The
341. See, e.g., Fla. H.R. Draft 251-179E-12-7, § 1, at 9 (1988) (on file with Fla. H.R.
Comm. on Judiciary).
342. Fla. CS for HB 7-E, § 1, at 23, lines 24-26 (1988) (First Engrossed).
343. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins., Amendment 24 to Fla. HB 7-E (1988) (Feb. 2, 1988) (on file
with committee).
344. See Fla. CS for HB 7-E (1988).
345. FLA. H.R. JOUR. 12 (Spec. Sess. Feb. 3, 1988).
346. Conference Comm. Tapes, supra note 247.
347. Id. (discussion by Donald G. Gifford, Ass't Exec. Dir. of the Task Force). To the ex-
tent that the legislation would prohibit a plaintiff from recovering economic damages in arbitra-
tion, including necessary medical care, the bill would place the plaintiff in the economic position
of having to refuse arbitration and proceed to trial with a limitation on noneconomic damages.
If the plaintiff cannot afford to arbitrate, the legislation would remove a remedy without provid-
ing commensurate benefits as required under Smith v. Department of Insurance, 507 So. 2d 1080
(Fla. 1987), and Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973). While the proposal submitted by the
Task Force limited noneconomic damages in arbitration, it provided for payment of a portion of
the plaintiff's legal fees, and eliminated the necessity of proving liability. Additionally, the limi-
tation on noneconomic damages at trial applied only where the plaintiff was unwilling to go to
arbitration. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 21-24.
348. Conference Comm. Tapes, supra note 247.
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amendment's defeat in conference was significant because the product
of a conference committee cannot be amended by either body once
adopted.3 49 The conference committee report was adopted unani-
mously and the meeting concluded.5 0
Before the conference report was presented to either chamber of the
Legislature, House Speaker Jon Mills"' learned that the committee
failed to pass Representative Upchurch's amendment. Since he was
aware of the limitation's potential constitutional problems, the
Speaker was determined that the conference report would not be
brought before the House prior to expiration of the special session.
He insisted that the provision limiting a physician's liability for eco-
nomic damages be deleted or no malpractice reform would pass. In an
unprecedented action, the conferees reconvened, reversed their posi-
tion and passed a clarifying amendment, which applied the limitation
on liability only to insurers rather than to named defendants.352 A
plaintiff who agrees to arbitration is now assured of full recovery of
the damages awarded, within the boundaries of the bill's other limita-
tions, except where a defendant proves to be insolvent.
V. FLORIDA BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURY
COMPENSATION PLAN
The Task Force proposed "adoption of legislation allowing physi-
cians and hospitals to participate in a no-fault plan limited to birth-
related neurological injuries."3 53 Although not the most sweeping of
reforms because of its limited application, the introduction of no-fault
as a viable alternative to common tort law in a field other than work-
ers' compensation is in itself a fairly revolutionary concept.
The plan forwarded to the Legislature was commonly referred to as
the Virginia Plan. 54 Although not yet implemented,355 the Virginia no-
fault system for compensating certain severely handicapped infants
offers the promise of decreasing the burden medical malpractice suits
place on obstetricians, with the objective of lowering their relatively
high premiums. In commending the plan to the Legislature, the Task
Force stated:
349. FLA. H.R. RULE 6.59.
350. Conference Comm. Tapes, supra note 247.
351. Dem., Gainesville, 1978-1988.
352. See ch. 88-1, § 54(3), 1988 Fla. Laws 119, 169 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.207(3)
(Supp. 1988)).
353. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 1.
354. The recommendation is modeled after the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (1988).
355. The Act became effective January 1, 1988. See, e.g., id. § 38.2-5002.
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[O]bstetricians were among the physicians most severely affected by
current medical malpractice problems. Obstetricians were more likely
than other physicians to have claims filed against them, their
malpractice premiums were among the highest and the recent
increases in malpractice premiums for obstetricians were greater than
for other physicians. The [Task Force's] Fact-Finding Report
specifically noted that in today's society, anything other than a
normal birth is considered an aberration and often leads to a claim
against the obstetrician.1 6
While the Task Force estimated medical malpractice insurance costs
for physicians in general to be 11.676 of gross practice revenues in
1986-1987, 1 7 the premiums of obstetricians & gynecologists were esti-
mated to represent 23.1% of their gross practice revenues.358 The
1986-1987 mean annual premium of $72,439 for obstetricians repre-
sents more than a 500% increase from the mean premium of $11,983
for Florida obstetricians in 1981-1982. 319 As a percentage of gross re-
venues, the malpractice premiums for obstetricians rose from 5.5% to
23.107o during the same five-year period. 60
The Virginia Plan offers potential savings to obstetricians in two
ways. First, by removing certain cases from the arena of medical mal-
practice, the premiums theoretically should decrease. Second, the plan
requires each licensed physician to contribute to the plan 3 61 as well as
hospitals providing maternity services who wish to receive the immu-
nity provided, 362 thus spreading the burden for financing the compen-
sation for the birth-related injuries.
The debate over the Virginia Plan centered on the fact that the plan
had not yet been tested. The Legislature generally agreed that the
premiums faced by obstetricians were particularly oppressive and re-
ports of decreasing availability of obstetrical services caused signifi-
cant concern.3 63 Therefore, rather than oppose outright the provisions
of the Virginia Plan, opponents argued for a delayed implementation.
They cautioned that the Legislature should not adopt a plan which
offered, but might not deliver, savings to obstetricians. If compensa-
356. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 31.




361. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5019(A)(3) (1988).
362. Id. § 38.2-5019(A)(2).
363. In a survey of Florida physicians, 260 of those who offered obstetrical services termi-
nated that part of their practice. See TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 248-
49.
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ble injury was defined too broadly, a significant number of infants
who would not recover damages under the tort system might find re-
covery here. That could mean that the additional compensation paid
under the Virginia Plan may outweigh any savings experienced by ob-
stetricians in malpractice premiums. In the Senate, these arguments,
coupled with concerns about the funding mechanism, were used suc-
cessfully to remove the Virginia Plan from consideration.3 6
Florida's version of the Virginia Plan proposed to fund the no-fault
compensation by requiring contribution of $250 per licensed physician
or osteopath,3 65 a $50 per birth contribution by hospitals,36 and an
additional contribution of $4,750 from each obstetrician wishing to be
covered.167 If these contributions are insufficient, each casualty insurer
would be assessed an amount equal to 0.25% of net direct premiums
written. 368 Assuming full participation of all obstetricians, the funding
would approach $22,250,000 annually.169
The plan adopted in Virginia provides compensation only for in-
fants suffering an injury to the brain or spinal cord caused by a me-
chanical failure or deprivation of oxygen.3 70 The injury must be so
severe as to leave the child permanently nonambulatory, incontinent,
unable to communicate, and in need of assistance in all aspects of
life.3 71 Virginia authorities estimated that the definitions would cover
approximately forty infants per year.372 In Florida, however, the con-
cern was that the definition was so restrictive that it would include
364. See Fla. SB 6-E (1988); Fla. CS for SB 6-E (1988); Fla. CS for SB 6-E (1988) (First
Engrossed).
365. Ch. 88-277, § 39(4)(b), 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1485 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
766.314(4)(b) (Supp. 1988)).
366. Id. § 39(4)(a), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1484 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.314(4)(a) (Supp.
1988)).
367. Id.
368. Id. § 39(5)(c), 1988 Fla. Laws at 1486 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.314(5)(6) (Supp.
1988)).
369. Letter from Jerome F. Vogel, Actuary, Fla. Dep't of Ins., Bureau of Rates, to Pamela
Birch Fort, Staff Dir., S. Comm. on Commerce (Jan. 11, 1988) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm.
on Ins.).
370. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001 (1988).
"Birth-related neurological injury" means injury to the brain or spinal cord of an
infant caused by the deprivation of oxygen or mechanical injury occurring in the
course of labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate post-delivery period in a
hospital which renders the infant permanently nonambulatory, aphasic, incontinent,




372. No-Fault Compensation for Neurologically Impaired Infants: An Exploration of the
Issues for the Insurance Panel, Harv. Sch. of Pub. Health 15 (Oct. 7, 1987) (on file, Florida
State University Law Review).
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very few infants. If this concern proves true, the definition defeats the
entire purpose for establishing the plan.
In response to the concerns raised over the restrictive definition,
Representative Bell, along with other sponsors of the House legisla-
tion, recommended extending the Virginia Plan to include infants re-
ceiving a permanent and substantial mental and physical disability.373
This definition would cover approximately sixty infants per year ac-
cording to a closed claim study by the Department of Insurance.37 4
However, a study based on birth data from the Department of Health
and Rehabilitative Services suggests that the definition would include
approximately 180 births. 7 If premature births were omitted, the
number of covered infants would be reduced to sixty, the same esti-
mate as the Department of Insurance.3 76 Assuming coverage of sixty
infants per year, the Department of Insurance estimated total costs of
approximately $45 million annually.3 77 The Senate had reasonable
concerns with the costs, since this figure was double the estimated rev-
enue provided in the first year.3 78 To cover 180 infants, the annual
costs were expected to reach $135 million,3 79 leaving an annual deficit
in excess of $100 million.
The House passed a substantially underfunded Virginia-type plan
which covered even premature infants suffering substantial permanent
mental and physical disability.3 80 The Senate proposed no plan at all.
Thus, the conference committee had to resolve the differences. The
solution was to pare down the program and to find a funding source
other than state general revenue dollars.
The first part of the solution was relatively simple. By removing
premature infants from eligibility for compensation under the pro-
gram, the cost estimates were returned to the $45 million range, one-
third the cost of the program approved by the House.3"' The second
part also was easily achieved. With the agreement of Insurance Com-
missioner Gunter, the House appropriated $40 million from the Insur-
373. Fla. HB 7-E, § 24(2) (1988).
374. Letter from Jerome F. Vogel, supra note 369.
375. Letter from John S. Curran, M.D., Acting Chairman, Dep't of Pediatrics, College of
Medicine, Univ. of S. Fla., to Robert Henderson, Staff Counsel, Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins. (Feb.
2, 1988) (on file with Fla. H.R. Comm. on Ins.).
376. Id.
377. Letter from Jerome F. Vogel, supra note 369.
378. Id.
379. This estimate assumes that the cost per incident will remain constant where coverage for
180 infants is provided rather than coverage for 60 infants.
380. Fla. CS for HB 7-E (1988) (First Engrossed).
381. Letter from John S. Curran, supra note 375. By removing coverage for premature ba-
bies, Dr. Curran estimated that the plan would cover only 60 infants. Id.
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ance Commissioner's Regulatory Trust Fund to subsidize the
premiums of physicians who practice in areas where there is a short-
age of the specialty provided by the physician.38 2 The House conferees
approved this recommendation, but the Senate rejected any premium
subsidy plans.3"3 After agreeing with the Senate not to adopt the pre-
mium subsidy provisions, the House conferees agreed to a proposal by
Senator Mattox Hair384 to use the $40 million Trust Fund money as a
backup for the Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Fund,3 85 $20 million of which was placed in the fund prior to the im-
plementation of the program.38 6 The remaining $20 million would be
available as needed. 87 The initial financial viability of the program
appeared to be guaranteed.
To provide adequate financing of the fund in future years, the com-
promise legislation provided that assessments of obstetricians, other
physicians, and hospitals be increased proportionately each year in ac-
cordance with a determination by the Department of Insurance as to
the amount of funds required to assure actuarial soundness of the
fund.38 By requiring actuarially sound proportional increases and
mandating continuing assessments against hospitals and physicians,
the plan is designed to avoid the problems that occurred with the Flor-
ida Patients' Compensation Fund.38 9 However, hospitals and other
physicians may find themselves funding a higher proportion of un-
funded liabilities if the plan allows obstetricians to withdraw.319
Under the plan, a claim may be brought on behalf of an infant
against the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation
Association (Association)3 91 by filing a claim with the Division of
382. Fla. CS for HB 7-E, § 18, at 29-30 (1988) (First Engrossed).
383. See Fla. CS for SB 6-E (1988) (First Engrossed).
384. Dem., Jacksonville, 1974-1988.
385. Conference Comm. Tapes, supra note 247.
386. Because of a drafting error, the first $20 million would not have been transmitted until
January 1, 1990, rather than January 1, 1989. See ch. 88-1, § 76(4), 1988 Fla. Laws 119, 184. See
also FLA. STAT. § 766.314(5)(b) (Supp. 1988).
387. See FLA. STAT. § 766.314(5)(b) (Supp. 1988).
388. Ch. 88-277, § 39(7)(b), 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1487 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.314(7)(b)
(Supp. 1988)).
389. Initial rates charged by the Patients' Compensation Fund were substantially inadequate,
resulting in significant assessments of participants to cover the shortfall. See Comment, Medical
Malpractice in Florida: Prescription For Change, 10 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 593, 598 (1983).
390. The Legislature did not address the manner in which any future unfunded liability
would be financed. It is unclear whether the Insurance Commissioner can increase assessments
for a current year to pay unfunded liabilities from prior years.
391. Ch. 88-277, § 40(l)(a), 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1487 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
766.315(l)(a) (Supp. 1988)). The Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Asso-
ciation is an independent entity; it is neither a state board, commission nor agency. It is gov-
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Workers' Compensation in the Department of Labor. 92 Recovery un-
der the plan is the exclusive remedy for injuries that qualify. Recovery
in tort is prohibited not only in relation to the obstetrician, but also
against all other parties to the extent that the claim involves the in-
jury. 93 Although the claim must name any hospital or physician in-
volved in the birth, neither the hospital nor the physician are parties
to the action.3 94
Upon receipt of the claim by the Division of Workers' Compensa-
tion, the Association is served with a copy of the claim and is pro-
vided forty-five days in which to submit "relevant written information
relating to the issue of whether the injury alleged is a birth-related
neurological injury."3 95 Discovery by both the Association and the
claimant is permitted in the form of interrogatories and depositions.3 96
Following receipt of the petition, the deputy commissioner must set
a date for the hearing no less than sixty nor more than 120 days from
the date of filing. 97 During that period, the claim must be reviewed by
a medical advisory panel consisting of a neurosurgeon, an obstetri-
cian, and a pediatrician.3 9 At least ten days prior to the scheduled
date of the hearing, the panel is required to report its finding as to
whether the injury qualifies as a compensable injury, i.e., whether the
injury resulted from mechanical failure or oxygen deprivation, and
whether the injury resulted in the child becoming substantially and
permanently mentally and physically disabled, requiring assistance in
all aspects of life. 99 At least one member of the panel is required to be
available to testify at the hearing. 4 Although the deputy commis-
sioner must consider the panel's finding, the finding is not binding. 40
Following the hearing, the deputy commissioner must determine if
the injury is birth-related. °2 If the injury was caused by oxygen depri-
erned by a board of directors consisting of five people appointed by the Insurance Commissioner
with each director serving for a term of three years. Of the five members, one represents obste-
tricians, one represents casualty insurers, one represents hospitals, one represents other physi-
cians, and one is a citizen representative. Nominees are recommended by the respective trade
associations, but the Insurance Commissioner is not bound by the recommendations.
392. Ch. 88-1, § 64, 1988 Fla. Laws 119, 175 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.305 (Supp. 1988)).
393. Ch. 88-277, § 37, 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1483 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.303 (Supp.
1988)).
394. See ch. 88-1, § 66(2), 1988 Fla. Laws 119, 177 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.307(2)
(Supp. 1988)).
395. Id. § 64(3), 1988 Fla. Laws at 176 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.305(3) (Supp. 1988)).
396. Id. § 66(3), 1988 Fla. Laws at 177 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.307(3) (Supp. 1988)).
397. Id.




402. Id. § 68(1)(a), 1988 Fla. Laws at 177 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.309(1)(a) (Supp.
1988)).
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vation or mechanical failure, and resulted in the required physical and
mental deprivations, the injury is presumed to have been birth-related,
and a party who disagrees with the presumption has the burden of
proving that the injury occurred at a time other than during the birth-
ing process. 4° The deputy commissioner must also determine whether
obstetrical services were provided by a participating physician4 and
the amount of compensation to be awarded.4°" Appeal of the decision
of the deputy commissioner may be made to the district court.406
Compensation for the infant under the no-fault plan is limited to
actual expenses for medically necessary and reasonable care including
medical, hospital, custodial, residential, and rehabilitative care. Ac-
tual expenses are limited to medically necessary drugs, special equip-
ment, and related travel. 40 7 Additionally, periodic or lump-sum
payments may be awarded to the parents or legal guardians in an
amount not to exceed $100,000.408 Expenses relating to the filing of
the claim, including attorney's fees, also may be recovered.4
The compensation provisions were amended twice at the suggestion
of Representative Upchurch during the conference committee to re-
duce the cost of the program and to protect against a probable consti-
tutional challenge. The plan, as enacted in Virginia and passed by the
Florida House, would provide a minimal wage recovery for the infant
who survives to adulthood. The wage recovery would be payable from
the time of the infant's eighteenth birthday until he or she turns sixty-
five. 410 The plan did not provide any funding to the parents as com-
pensation for their lost derivative actions. The conferees replaced the
403. Id. § 68(2), 1988 Fla. Laws at 178 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.309(2) (Supp. 1988)).
404. Id. § 68(1)(a)(2)(b), 1988 Fla. Laws at 178 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.309(l)(a)(2)(b)
(Supp. 1988)). If the obstetrical services are delivered by a physician who did not pay the voluntary
additional assessment, the injury is not covered and the child may pursue a claim for negligence
through the normal tort system. Since most hospitals are required to pay an assessment regardless of
whether the obstetrician who delivered the child participates in the program, it is likely that most
hospitals will require membership in the Association as a condition to maintaining or obtaining staff
privileges as an obstetrician. Id.
405. Id. § 68(l)(c), 1988 Fla. Laws at 178 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.309(l)(c) (Supp.
1988)).
406. Id. § 70, 1988 Fla. Laws at 179 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.311 (Supp. 1988)).
407. Id. § 69(1), 1988 Fla. Laws at 178 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.31(1) (Supp. 1988)). The
amount awarded is to be decreased by certain recoveries from collateral sources including gov-
ernmental support and health insurance.
408. Id. § 69(l)(b), 1988 Fla. Laws at 179 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.31(1)(b) (Supp.
1988)).
409. Id. § 69(l)(c), 1988 Fla. Laws at 179 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.31(l)(c) (Supp.
1988)).
410. Under the Virginia Act, as well as the Florida House Proposal, the child is entitled to
receive 50% of the average weekly wage from age 18 until 65. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009(3)
(1988); Fla. CS for HB 7-E, § 32(1)(b), at 44, lines 8-18 (1988) (First Engrossed).
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wage provision with a provision allowing compensation for the parent
or legal guardian, recognizing that the anticipated life span for many
of the infants may be short, but that the loss to the parent would be
long term. 411 This change has the effect of placing the funds with the
infant's guardian at an earlier period. If the guardian invests these
funds, they are likely to produce a greater return than the lost wages
would have produced. 412 The second modification was intended to
permit the deputy commissioner to arrange for the placement of the
child in a state facility rather than in a more expensive private facility
where residential treatment is required. 4 13 The amendment, however,
referred to custodial treatment rather than residential treatment. 41 4
Custodial treatment is not provided in state-designated facilities, and
thus the amendment did not have its intended effect.
If the claim is denied, the claimant may proceed with an action at
law in accordance with the provisions governing medical negligence
actions. The filing of a claim against the Association tolls the statute
of limitations for any medical malpractice action during the pendency
of the claim and during appeal. 415 Although no provision is made for
tolling the time in which a claim may be filed for recovery under the
no-fault plan during the pendency of a medical malpractice claim, a
seven-year limitation is provided, 41 6 as opposed to the hybrid two-,
four-, or seven-year statute of limitations applicable to malpractice ac-
tions. 4 ,7
The finding of the deputy commissioner that the injury is not a
birth-related neurological injury is binding upon the obstetrician, thus
prohibiting this as a defense in a subsequent tort proceeding relating
to the injury. 418 The legislation, however, does not specify that the
finding is binding upon other health care practitioners. If the court
finds the injury is a birth-related neurological injury, but the deputy
commissioner reaches a different conclusion, theoretically the plaintiff
411. The conference committee members were advised that the average anticipated life span
for children covered by the Virginia Plan is seven years. Since the definition used in Florida is
intended to be less restrictive, the information received relating to the Virginia Plan may be
inapplicable.
412. At present, 500 of the average weekly wage in Florida produces an income of less than
$9,000 annually.
413. See ch. 88-1, § 69(1)(a), 1988 Fla. Laws 119, 178 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.31(1)(a)
(Supp. 1988)).
414. Id.
415. Id. § 65, 1988 Fla. Laws at 176 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.306 (Supp. 1988)).
416. Ch. 88-277, § 38, 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1483 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.313 (Supp.
1988)).
417. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1987).
418. Ch. 88-1, § 68(3), 1988 Fla. Laws 119, 178 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.309(3) (Supp.
1988)).
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is denied a forum in which to litigate the claim against the hospital or
assisting physicians. Likewise, the legislation does not specify whether
a finding by a court is binding on the Association. Accordingly, the
Association, in theory, may contest a claim before the deputy com-
missioner even where a judge or jury finds for the health care provider
on its defense that the injury is qualified as a birth-related neurologi-
cal injury. Such a result would deny the claimant the right to redress 419
and the right to due process. 420 Thus, the statute appears to be subject
to an "unconstitutional as applied" challenge, and the courts may be
required to fashion an appropriate remedy.4 2 1
The establishment of an exclusive no-fault plan for compensating
infants who suffer certain injuries at birth clearly denies those infants
their right to seek redress in the courts and a trial by jury where the
injury is the result of medical negligence. But, it is intended to offer a
balanced approach to solve a public crisis. 4 22 Like workers' compensa-
tion, it is designed to provide a reasonable alternative to recovery un-
der the tort system and eliminates the need for the claimant to
establish fault. Nonetheless, the plan is not necessarily free from con-
stitutional challenges in its denial of both access to courts and a right
to trial by jury. Since recovery is available only where-the injury re-
sults from oxygen deprivation or mechanical failure occurring at
birth, 423 the statute appears to require both proof of the injury and a
causal connection between the birth process and the injury. While it
does not require an actual showing of negligence, clearly it requires a
greater degree of proof than is required under Florida's other no-fault
system, workers' compensation. 24
419. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21.
420. See id. § 9.
421. To some extent, this issue could be remedied by a rule requiring that the Florida Birth-
Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association be named as a cross-defendant in any
action in which the defendant raises the defense that the injury is covered under the Florida
Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan.
422. See, e.g., Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987). To sustain legisla-
tion in derogation of the right of access to the courts, the legislation must provide either com-
mensurate benefits or a showing of overpowering necessity. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d I (Fla.
1973).
423. See ch. 88-277, § 36(2), 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1482 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.302(2)
(Supp. 1988)).
424. Under workers' compensation, the claimant need only prove that the injury arose out of
and in the course of employment. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(l) (1987). However, under the Florida
Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, the plaintiff must prove not only that the
injury arose from the birthing process, but that it was caused by either oxygen deprivation or a
mechanical failure. See supra notes 370-80 and accompanying text.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
VI. EMERGENCY ROOM AND TRAuMA CARE LIABILITY REFORM
The legislation concerning emergency room and trauma care liabil-
ity focuses on lowering the standard of care, 425 limiting who may pro-
vide expert testimony in liability cases involving "emergency medical
services, '426 and requests the Supreme Court of Florida to establish
standard jury instructions for such cases. 427 To guarantee the
availability of emergency care, the 1988 Act limits the ability of hospi-
tals to reduce emergency services428 and prohibits physicians from
agreeing among themselves to reduce emergency care delivery.4 29
In no area of medicine has the medical malpractice crisis been more
evident than in emergency room and trauma care. From 1983 to 1987,
emergency medicine physicians experienced greater liability premium
increases than any other medical specialty. 430 Even physicians in medi-
cal specialties other than emergency medicine were susceptible to the
liability crisis surrounding emergency care. One survey indicates that
forty-three percent of medical malpractice cases against Florida neu-
rosurgeons originated from emergency cases. 41 As a result, emergency
rooms and trauma centers became the focus of a physician rebellion
against medical malpractice. Some emergency rooms in South Florida
closed while others curtailed services, 432 prompting the American Med-
ical Association to declare South Florida "the Beirut" of medical
malpractice .433
In response to the crisis, Governor Martinez organized the Gover-
nor's Task Force on Emergency Room and Trauma Care (Emergency
Room Task Force) in early 1987. 414 The Emergency Room Task Force
forwarded a number of specific reform proposals. One proposed to
change the standard of care in medical malpractice cases involving
425. See infra notes 439-48 and accompanying text.
426. See infra notes 449-53 and accompanying text.
427. Ch. 88-277, § 45, 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1492.
428. See infra notes 455-56 and accompanying text.
429. See infra notes 457-59 and accompanying text.
430. TASK FORCE FACT-FINDING REPORT, supra note 2, at 29-30. Emergency room physicians
experienced a 49% annual increase in premiums during the period. Other medical specialties with
relatively large premium increases included obstetrics & gynecology (46%), thoracic surgery
(44%), cardiovascular surgery (44%), neurological surgery (44%), and orthopedic surgery
(42%). Id.
431. FLORIDA NEUROLOGICAL Soc'y., FLORIDA NEUROLOGICAL LAWSUIT PROFILE (1987).
432. See supra note 81.
433. Ver Berkmoes, South Florida Faces 'Semi-battlefield Condition' In Care, AM. MED.
NEWS, July 17, 1987, at 2.
434. REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON EMERGENCY ROOM AND TRAUMA CARE
(Mar. 31, 1987) [hereinafter EMERGENCY AND TRAUMA REPORT]. This group is distinct from the
Academic Task Force for Review of the Insurance and Tort Systems (Task Force).
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emergency care to gross negligence. Other recommendations included
requiring physicians to provide emergency room coverage as a condi-
tion of hospital staff membership, establishing qualification criteria
for expert witnesses in emergency care malpractice cases, and expand-
ing funding for indigent emergency care. 435 Though the Governor ini-
tially failed to endorse the recommendations of the Emergency Room
Task Force,43 6 many of these concepts became a part of the 1988 med-
ical malpractice legislation.
The other Task Force, whose recommendations helped to sculpt the
1988 Act, did not make any recommendations directed at emergency
room or trauma care. 4 7 In considering the possibility of compensating
medical injuries arising from emergency and trauma care on a no-
fault basis, that Task Force noted the difficulty in defining emergency
and trauma care. For example, it questioned whether the definition of
an emergency or trauma case depends on where treatment is rendered,
(i.e., in an emergency room as opposed to a physician's office), or if
the critical distinction is whether the patient is treated by the person's
own physician or by an "emergency medicine" specialist. An alterna-
tive, and perhaps more meaningful designation, defined the emer-
gency or trauma patient according to the. nature and severity of the
patient's illness or injury. As a result of this definitional difficulty, the
Task Force determined that no-fault compensation of medical injuries
in emergency rooms and trauma centers would be "prohibitively ex-
pensive, at worst, and impossible to predict, at best. ' 43 8 Despite these
difficulties, the perceived gravity of the emergency room liability crisis
led the 1988 Legislature to address specific reforms to the problem.
The most celebrated liability reform in emergency and trauma medi-
cine is the change in the standard of care required in cases arising
from injuries received in emergency rooms and trauma centers. Prior
law made no distinction between emergency and non-emergency situa-
tions with regard to the standard of care required of physicians prac-
ticing in offices or hospitals. 4 9 Generally, professionals, including
435. EMERGENCY AND TRAuMA REPORT, supra note 434, at 48.
436. See id.
437. TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 50, at 2-3.
438. See id. at 31-32.
439. Section 768.13(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), addressed physician liability arising from
"code blue" emergencies in hospitals or trauma centers. "Code blue" emergencies generally are
those involving cardiopulmonary arrest that require immediate application of cardiopulmonary
resuscitation (CPR). The statute provided that any physician responding gratuitously and in
good faith to such emergencies
shall not be held liable for any civil damages as a result of such care or treatment or as
a result of any act or failure to act in providing or arranging further medical treatment
where the person [physician] acts as a reasonably prudent person licensed to practice
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physicians, are held to a standard of care commensurate with their
special knowledge, training, and ability. 440 A physician's failure to
meet this standard of care is actionable medical negligence. 44  The
1988 legislation alters the standard of care for physicians and hospi-
tals rendering emergency care to patients in hospital emergency rooms
and trauma centers." 2 Actionable malpractice in such cases occurs
only when hospitals and physicians act in a manner which demon-
strates "reckless disregard" for the life or health of the patient. 443 The
reckless disregard standard applies only until the patient is stabilized
and does not apply to care unrelated to the original emergency." If
the patient undergoes surgery as a result of the initial emergency, the
reckless disregard standard applies until the patient stabilizes after
surgery.445
While this alteration in the standard of care appears to be a gross
deviation from the prior standard, 446 that is not the case. For purposes
of the 1988 Act, the Legislature defined "reckless disregard" as con-
duct which, at the time services were rendered, the health care pro-
vider "knew or should have known" would be likely to result in
medicine who would have acted under the same or similar circumstances.
Id. While this statute superficially appears to impose a different standard of care in emergency
situations, closer analysis reveals that the standard imposed- reasonable and prudent profes-
sional care under the circumstances-is identical to the standard imposed on physicians in non-
emergency situations. This statute was amended in 1988. Ch. 88-277, § 42, 1988 Fla. Laws 1422,
1490 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(b) (Supp. 1988)).
For physicians delivering care gratuitously and in good faith outside of traditional medical
settings, a different standard is applied. The Good Samaritan Act provides that physicians in
these instances are immune from civil liability as long as they act as "a reasonably prudent man
would have acted under the same circumstances." FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(a) (1987). This appears
to hold the physician to the same standard of care as a lay citizen. At any rate, section
768.13(2)(a), applies only to treatment rendered outside of traditional medical settings and has
no relevance to emergency room or trauma center care.
440. See, e.g., W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 112, § 32, at 186-87. In Florida, the
professional standard of care is the "level of care, skill, and treatment which, in light of all
relevant surrounding circumstances, is recognized as acceptable and appropriate by reasonably
prudent similar health care providers." FLA. STAT. § 768.45(1) (1987). The standard of care for a
Florida health care provider practicing as a "specialist" is determined by reference to other
health care providers practicing in the same specialty. Id. § 768.45(2)(b). Health care providers
not certified as specialists are held to a standard of care that is determined by reference to "simi-
lar health care providers" licensed in Florida. Id. § 768.45(2)(a).
441. FLA. STAT. § 768.45(1) (1987).
442. Ch. 88-277, § 42, 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1490 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(b)
(Supp. 1988)).
443. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(b)(1) (Supp. 1988)).
444. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(b)(2)(b) (Supp. 1988)).
445. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(b)(2)(a) (Supp. 1988)).
446. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 112, at § 34 (reckless is "[a]n act of an
unreasonable character [intentionally] in disregard of a known or obvious risk").
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injury to the patient.4 7 In determining whether the health care pro-
vider should have known that the conduct would injure the patient, all
circumstances surrounding the health care provider's relationship with
the patient should be considered. 448
Taking into account the legislative definition of "reckless disre-
gard," it is not clear that the new standard of care is substantially
different from the old. Conduct that a health care provider "knew or
should have known" would be injurious to a patient qualifies as
"negligent" under the prior standard. Conversely, it is difficult to
imagine conduct actionably negligent under prior law which is not
considered "reckless disregard" under present law. While the legal
differences between the new and old standards may be minimal or ab-
sent, it is possible that the use of the words "reckless disregard" will
have a practical effect. Juries may be hesitant to find "reckless disre-
gard" when faced with health care providers who acted in good faith.
Finally, the statute's emphasis on the circumstances surrounding the
emergency, such as severity of illness or injury, absence of prior doc-
tor-patient relationship, incomplete medical history, and lack of time
for appropriate consultation, may add force to a defense attorney's
trial presentation of these factors.
In addition to specifying the standard of care applicable in emer-
gency rooms and trauma centers, the Legislature limited who may
provide expert testimony in malpractice cases involving the delivery of
emergency medical services in a hospital emergency room." 9 Expert
testimony is allowed only from health care providers 450 with "substan-
tial professional experience" in a hospital emergency setting within
the preceding five years. 451 Prior law permitted expert testimony from
health care providers similar to the defendant, 452 or in the court's dis-
cretion, from health care providers with sufficient teaching or practice
experience in the preceding five years in a field related to the defen-
dant's. 453 Theoretically, requiring the expert witness to have substan-
447. Ch. 88-277, § 42(2)(b)(3), 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1490 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.13(2)(b)(3) (Supp. 1988)).
448. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.13(2)(b)(3)(a)-(e) (Supp. 1988)).
449. Ch. 88-1, § 78(6)(a), 1988 Fla. Laws 119, 184 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.102(6)(a)
(Supp. 1988)).
450. The 1988 Act refers to physicians, osteopathic physicians, podiatrists, and chiroprac-
tors. Id.
451. Id. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 766.102(6)(b)(2) (Supp. 1988)). The 1988 Act defines sub-
stantial professional experience according to the custom and practice of emergency medicine in
the same or similar localities as that involved in the claim. Id.
452. FLA. STAT. § 768.45(2)(c)(1) (1987).
453. Id. § 768.45(2)(c)(2).
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tial experience will improve the qualifications of witnesses testifying at
medical malpractice trials involving emergency care.
The 1988 Act also contains provisions designed to improve citizens'
access to health care. Undoubtedly, these provisions are a response to
the much publicized curtailments of emergency services in South Flor-
ida in 1986 and 1987. 4 14 The first of these provisions requires hospitals
to obtain the approval of the Department of Health and Rehabilita-
tive Services (HRS) before substantially reducing emergency room or
trauma services . 4  To obtain HRS approval, the hospital must dem-
onstrate that no public need exists for continuing the particular emer-
gency room or trauma service.4 6 The Legislature also took steps to
prevent physicians from refusing to treat emergency room patients.
Concerted action by physicians to curtail the availability of emergency
services to patients is a basis for disciplinary action by the Department
of Professional Regulation (DPR).4 5 7 Additionally, DPR or the af-
fected hospital may file suit in circuit court to enjoin physicians from
violating the statute.4 58 If an injunction is issued, a physician who vio-
lates the injunction is subject to a fine of at least $5,000.49
VII. CONCLUSION
The 1988 malpractice legislation offers not only hope for a final
solution to the medical malpractice problems experienced in this state,
but also an example for future legislatures which may address simi-
larly complex and politically charged issues. The decision to assign
these issues to academic study by an independent and neutral body
permitted an open and thorough discussion of facts, perceptions, and
options for reform. These panel members were able to voice opinions
without concern for political reprisals from interest groups or from
the electorate.
Whether the 1988 legislation will withstand inevitable constitutional
challenges and improve the availability of medical liability insurance
remains to be seen. What is clear, however, is that the Legislature, in
following the studied advice of the Task Force, has been willing to
take bold and innovative steps to solve a most difficult and controver-
sial problem. Hopefully, the Legislature will follow the further advice
454. See supra note 81.
455. Ch. 88-1, § 4, 1988 Fla. Laws 119, 129 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 395.0146 (Supp. 1988)).
456. Id.
457. Ch. 88-277, § 9, 1988 Fla. Laws 1422, 1440 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 458.3295 (Supp.
1988)). The Legislature passed an identical provision for osteopathic physicians. Id. § 12, 1988
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of the Task Force and permit the reforms to take hold for a sufficient
period of time before it takes any further action.
